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Glossary
• Agantic: a relationship that can be traced by the male descent.
• Ambilocality: a living arrangement under which husband and wife continue to
live with their respective parents and the husband visits the wife in her home.
• Avunculocal: a living arrangement where married individuals live with or near an
uncle.
• Bilateral descent: recognized through both the father and the mothers sides of
the family.
• Bridewealth or brideprice: payments made to the bride’s family by the grooms
family before marriage.
• Clan: a social division within descent groups who are united by the known links
to a common ancestor.
• Cogantic: a relationship where kinship can be traced through both parents, as
practised in most western societies.
• Cross-cousin marriage: a custom permitting marriage between children of sib-
lings of opposite sex. Examples include marriage with father’s sister’s daughter,
mother’s brother’s daughter, or widower marrying sister of his deceased wife (soro-
rate) or a wife marrying brother of her deceased husband (levirate).
• Descent: commonly understood by lineage from a common ancestor that provide
members with a sense of identity and social support based on ties of shared ancestry.
• Dowry: payment made to the grooms family by the bride’s family before marriage.
• Duolocal: a marriage custom in which each spouse continues to reside with their
kin after marriage.
• Ecological niche: a geographical location, in which an ethnic group resides in
relation to its natural environment or a habitat that supplies the factors supporting
subsistence of said ethnic group.
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• Ecosystem: the complex of an ethnic group and its environment functioning as an
ecological unit in nature.
• Endogamy: a marriage custom that restricts marriage outside geographic units
(village endogamy), or ethnic groups (community endogamy or clan endogamy).
• Environment: the external surrounding conditions, such as temperature, precipi-
tation, forest cover, or soil properties of a geographic location.
• Equigeniture: where the all the children inherit equal share of property.
• Ethnic group: a distinct group of individuals with common linguistic, biological
or cultural features.
• Excommunication: a process of expelling an individual or family from a society
or social divisions by the members of the respective society.
• Extended family: share a household with at least three-generations.
• Exogamy: a custom that restricts marriage within one’s own clan, community or
village.
• Family: a group of individuals who are in blood relation.
• Geographical region: a territorial region consisting of largely similar climatic,
soil, and terrain characteristics.
• Household: a group of related or unrelated persons who reside together.
• Joint family: a very large extended family where multiple generations reside to-
gether.
• Kinship: a term used to describe culturally recognized ties between members of a
society or family, and the normative behaviors associated with it.
• Kinship system: the pattern of culturally recognized relationships between mem-
bers of a society or family.
• Lineage: a group that traces its descent from a common progenitor or ancestor.
• Matriarchal society: where women have the full authority to take decisions.
• Matrilineal descent: a kinship relation where descendants can be traced through
female ancestors.
• Matrilocal: a marriage custom where the groom reside with the bride’s parental
house
2
• Moiety: an endogamous halves or sub-division within an ethnic group.
• Neolocal: a kind of post marital residence where the couple sets up a new household
in a locality independent of either of their parental homes.
• Patrilineal descent: a kinship relation where descendants can be traced through
male ancestors.
• Patrilocal: a post-marital residence custom in which a married couple resides with
the groom’s parental house.
• Phratry: a kinship unit of two or more clans formed on the basis of brotherhoods
within which marriages are forbidden.
• Polygyny: a custom in which a man can have multiple wives at the same time,
as opposed to monogamy, where an individual has a single spouse or polyandry
when a woman has multiple husbands.
• Primogeniture: where the first-born child inherits all property.
• Role is a set of expected behaviors of an individual according to their status.
• Shifting cultivation: (also known as jhum cultivation) a type of cultivation in
hilly terrain, which is performed by clearing a forest patch with a slash and burn
method for about two to four years, after which the land is left for regeneration of
forest, and a new patch of land is selected for cultivation.
• Stem family: a sub-type of an extended family where an older couple and one of
their adult children live with a spouse (or spouses) and children.
• Status: any culturally-assigned position a person in a particular society.
• Ultimogeniture: where the last-born child inherits all property.
• Unilineal system: involves descent through either father’s lineage (patrilineal)
or mother’s lineage (matrilineal) which is opposite to bilateral descent where the
lineage can be traced from both father’s side and mother’s side, typically prevalent
in western societies.
• Wet cultivation: a type of paddy cultivation that requires irrigation.
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Introduction
Institutions impact economic development. The macroeconomic effects of institutions are
visible on per capita income (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001), trade (Dollar
and Kraay, 2003), and long run growth (Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000). There are two
approaches to what constitutes an institution. The first approach considers institutions
as a set of humanly, politically, or socially determined rules or constraints (North, 1990).
Individuals take these rules or constraints as exogenously given and are aware of the costs
of their actions when they interact with the market or society at large. Alternatively,
institutions are self-enforcing (Williamson, 2000). In the equilibrium, the self-enforcing
and predictable patterns of behavior emerges due to agents are unlikely to change their
behavior that are optimal given the choices of other agents.
Douglas North (1990) classify institutions on the basis of enforcement and formality.
The formal institutions are constitutional, legal, and political. The informal institutions
include socially sanctioned behaviors or norms which are socially enforced. These social
norms (e.g., customs, traditions, taboos) evolve due to coordinated repeated interaction
of humans in a society. Williamson (2000) classify institutions in four hierarchy-based
schemes. At the first level, informal institutions (social norms, customs, traditions) are
embedded in the social structure. These exogenous life-ways of a society persist over a
very long horizon, usually from 100 to 1,000 years. The remaining three higher levels of
institutions relate to rules of the game, play of the game, and allocation mechanisms. The
frequency of change of these higher levels of institutions is less than 100 years. I focus on
social norms, which are persistent, exogenous and informal institutions, embedded in the
society.
The fundamental building block of a society is the family formed by marital alliances
and regulated by kinship systems (Fox, 1934). In its simple exposition, the kinship system
proscribe social norms on how a set of individuals, families and societies are organized and
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related (Radcliffe-Brown, 1950). Furthermore, kinship systems determine how individuals
and families trace their social group (ethnicity, clan, sub-clan, moiety, or phratry) affil-
iations through social norms regarding lineage, descent, and inheritance (Lowes, 2020).
I concentrate on the effects of social norms that are relevant to the status of women
in a society, which affects the bargaining within the households (Lowes, 2020). Intra-
household bargaining and the decisions taken by spouses within marriage has important
effects on the functioning of the economy (Becker, 1991). Spousal decisions over labor
supply, fertility choices, and human capital investment in their children can have impor-
tant bearing on the economy as a whole. Marriage-specific social norms also determine
how the spouses are matched, their living arrangements, and the distribution factors
within the marriage. Certain pro-women social norms can change status of women and
can lead to more favorable outcomes for women and female children. This can be directly
interpreted as improved outside options of women, which directly affects their bargaining
power, and hence favorable distribution factors in accordance with their preferences. In
this dissertation I empirically estimate the effects of these pro-women social norms, which
are both exogenous and persistent on the contemporary outcomes for women and children
(La Ferrara and Milazzo, 2017; Alesina, Brioschi, and La Ferrara, 2016; Milazzo, 2014)
Building the foundation for this empirical research is not trivial. In a carefully chosen
cross-cultural setting, at the outset, I attempt to limit the scope by only considering ethno-
graphic data coming from qualitative studies of various ethnic groups. This limitation
facilitates empirical feasibility. Coding the qualitative ethnographic data in accordance
with the universal patterns of variation from culture to culture and from society to society
was the next challenge. Two graduate students, one from the ethnology and the other
from the economics played special roles in the time and effort intensive double-blind cod-
ing of the qualitative ethnography. The student in ethnology worked with me at the
inception stage, helping me to review the literature on the theories of universal patterns
of social norms (Dole, 1965). I incorporate these anthropological insights into economic
analysis. The graduate student from economics department, who worked with me later,
used a set of definitions of 30 social norms to code the social norms. For little above
one-third of the sample ethnic groups, the codes of both the students are identical. For
the remaining ethnic groups, the two coders frequently agree, and where they disagreed
— initially ranging between 5% and 33% of social norms — their disagreements were
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resolved after reconsidering the qualitative texts and harmonizing the codes. For this
dissertation, I select 92 aboriginal ethnic groups from the marginalized sections of the
society, presuming that the effects of modernization would be limited on their traditional
customs.
The ethnographic atlases form the micro-foundation for the wealth of literature on
‘social capital’. My attempt to code the ethnography is twofold: (a) to understand
how historical social norms and social roles change over time, and (b) to link histori-
cal social norms with present day outcomes. Within the universal framework of marriage
and kinship, I code for wealth transactions at marriage (dowry and brideprice), marital
composition (monogamy and polygamy), domestic organization (nuclear or stem family),
transfer of marital residence (patrilocal, matrilocal or neolocal), kinship marriage (preva-
lent forms of cousin marriages and exogamy, descent and inheritance norms. To assess
the position of women within marriage, I code divorce rules, alimony rights, child custody
rights, and ease of remarriage. For the gender roles, I code the subsistence economy (use
of plough, agriculture, gathering, hunting, fishing, and animal husbandry), labor gender,
and economy (female participation in agriculture, gathering, hunting, fishing, animal hus-
bandry, weaving, basketry, and politics), as well as community organization of housing
and property (settlement patterns, community ownership of land).
My study area is set in the northeastern states of India for following five reasons.
First, northeastern India is one of the most diverse places on earth. The 2001 Indian
census lists 243 tribal groups (commonly referred to as ‘Scheduled Tribes’ under article
342 of the Constitution of India) speaking more than 200 languages, and comprising a
population of 39 million, which offers sufficient variation in ethnic diversity by interna-
tional comparison. Second, the northeastern states comprise a relatively small, politically
homogenous area that is replete with almost all kinds of subsistence activities with sub-
stantial variations. This geographic area is culturally distant from the rest of India, due
to the ethnic variations it still preserves and nurtures, even today. This allows a study
of effects of ancestral lifestyles in isolation because the zone has much less exposure to
modernization in the rest of India. Third, in order to examine the persistence of cultural
traits, we need a reference ethnography from the pre-industrial period. Since the ethnog-
raphy coded and used in this study are relatively recent, for comparison over time. In the
widely used Murdock’s (1967) ethnographic atlas, there are 50 ethnic groups coded for
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Indian subcontinent, 41 fall within the present day geographic boundaries of India1. Of
these, I can trace 16 ethnic groups which can be georeferenced in the northeastern zone
of India. Fourth, to the best of my knowledge, the strand in literature that focuses of
kinship institutions in India has left the northeastern zone out of their analysis despite
its enormous cultural diversity. Fifth, we are interested in the tribal community because
of the practice of their primitive traits, distinctive culture, geographical isolation, shyness
of contact with the mainstream communities at large, and backwardness, even after the
waves of modernization (Government of India, 1955). In comparison to the all-India av-
erage of the ‘scheduled tribe’ population, 8.6% as per Census data of 2011, in the eight
northeastern states, the proportion of scheduled tribes is as high as 27%.2
I contribute a relatively large dataset to the research community, which combines
ethnography with the nationally-representative samples from India’s Demographic and
Health Surveys. Thus far, a growing body of literature utilizes either the Standard Cross-
Cultural Samples or Murdock’s ethnographic atlas, especially in the African context,
because, for the rest of the world, the coverage of these popularly used ethnography are
both scattered and scant. Compared to ethnic diversity of India, the Murdock’s atlas
covers 41 ethnic groups. In this dissertation, I introduce an Indian ethnographic atlas
called the People of India, containing the ethnography of 4635 ethnic groups, hitherto
unused by economists. During October 1985 and March 1992, the Anthropological Survey
of India conducted a publicly funded survey called People of India. The ethnographic
profiles were collected by 600 ethnographers, who collectively spent 26,000 days in the
field to identify, locate and study the ethnicities. These are publicly available in a multi-
volume compendium of books. For each ethnicity, the social norms surrounding the birth,
marriage, separation, death, lineage, and inheritance are covered. The other source,
namely the Demographic and Health Surveys, covers information on demography, health,
and nutritional aspects of individuals. The combined datasets open up a new possibility
for more nuanced analysis. The third source is to integrate the environmental factors,
1Adi, Aimol, Angami, Ao, Baiga, Bengali, Bhil, Bihari, Chakma, Chenchu, Garo, Gond, Gujarati,
Hill Bhuiya, Ho, Indo-Iranian, Kachari, Karbi, Kashmiri, Kerala, Khasi, Khond, Kodavas, Kohistani
(in Pakistan), Kol, Koya, Kuki, Kurukh, Lhota, Madia, Magar (in Nepal), Marri (in Pakistan), Muria,
Pahari, Punjabi (in Pakistan), Purum, Reddi, Rengma, Santal, Sema, Shina (in Pakistan), Sindhi (in
Pakistan), Sinhalese (in Sri Lanka), Tamil, Telugu, Thado, Toda, Uttar Pradesh, Vedda (in Sri Lanka),
Yusufzai (in Pakistan).
2The proportion of ‘scheduled tribe’ population as per Census 2011 data was 20.6% in Sikkim, 64.2%
in Arunachal Pradesh, 89.1% in Nagaland, 34.2% in Manipur, 94.5% in Mizoram, 31.1% in Tripura,
85.9% in Meghalaya, and 12.4% in Assam.
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such as land suitability for various types of subsistence patterns linked to the probable
ancestral homeland of the aboriginal ethnic groups.
I take up two topics relating to women’s status that use cross-sectional data combined
with ethnography and environmental variables.
In the first essay, titled “Social Norms, Women’s Status and Spousal Violence: Evi-
dence from India’s North-East”, I estimate the long-run effects of ancestral social norms
and ancestral female productive roles in subsistence on spousal violence. I georeference 92
aboriginal ethnic groups for their ancestral homelands, as well as their ancestral life-ways
living in northeastern zone of India. Using the stated ethnic identity of the respondents
in the third wave of the National Family and Health Survey(NFHS), I combine both the
ancestral characteristics and environmental characteristics with the cross-sectional data
on 6,400 married women and 4,400 married men. The outcomes of interest are spousal
violence experienced by women and attitudes of women and men towards spousal vio-
lence. The explanatory variables are ancestral female productive roles, conjugal living
arrangements , descent rules, and ease of divorce norms.
The main results are as follows. First, ancestral female productive roles predict re-
duced incidence of sexual atrocities today. Second, matrilineal descent significantly re-
duces the experience of physical and sexual violence and reduces the average number of
atrocities ever experienced by a married woman by about one quarter. The endorsement
of spousal violence is less among men in societies with matrilineal decent norms. Third,
in societies where an easier divorce regime is prevalent, women are prone to justify vio-
lence, while men justify violence less. Consistent with received theories of the marriage,
these results suggest that increased productive roles of women enhance the well-being of
women, and the persistence of pro-women social norms minimize the ill-being of women.
Even though these results do not allow causal interpretations, improved status of women
in a society can improve their well-being in the marriage.
While the first chapter discusses the effects of social norms on spousal violence, in the
second chapter, titled “Social Norms, Subsistence Patterns and Gender Bias: Evidence
from India’s North-East”, I investigate the effects of ancestral female productive roles
in subsistence activities and ancestral social norms relevant for women’s social status on
gender bias experienced by contemporary infants and children. Similar to the first chapter,
I assemble both ethnographic and environmental characteristics for 92 aboriginal ethnic
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groups, and I pool over 51,000 child-level and 22,000 mother-level observations from the
second and third waves of the NFHS. The outcomes of interest are succeeding birth
interval, incidence of last birth, breastfeeding spell, incidence of total vaccination, protein
intake by children, and child mortality under the age of three years. The explanatory
variables are an indicator for whether the child is a female child and its interaction with
the identical set of variables used in the first chapter. Since the first three dependent
variables have censored observations, I estimate Cox’s Proportional Hazard Models. For
the remaining dependent variables, I use OLS.
My findings are as follows. First, in societies where women ancestrally participate in
agriculture and allied productive activities, a female child is less likely to experience the
birth of her next younger siblings in tight interval. Similar beneficial effects for female
child are observed in ethnicities with ancestral social norms that improve women’s status.
Second, the incidence of last birth for a female child increases when the divorce norms
are easier and less costly. Third, the risk of breastfeeding stop is reduced in societies
where women ancestrally participate in agriculture, and the living arrangement of the
wife is not with her husband’s family (non-patrilocal residency). Fourth, the likelihood of
protein intake by children increases in ethnic groups that follow matrilineal descent, non-
patrilocal residency, and easier divorce regimes. The estimated hazard ratios and marginal
effects are identical even after I include the contemporary occupation status for women
as an explanatory variable. However, the effect of contemporary female employment is
not statistically associated with the outcome variables. Although it is difficult to claim
causal interpretations, these estimates are consistent with the predictions from economic
theories. Overall, it appears that in ethnic groups where women are valued, due to their
ancestral productive roles, and their status is high, due to ancestral social norms, a female
child is less likely to face discrimination and disadvantage.
In hindsight, it was never my intention to write a dissertation on social norms focusing
on kinship organizations. As I progress in the pursuit to understand the constraints that
societies impose on women by keeping them from being empowered, and as the results
of each paper become reinforcing, the next question came up. Throughout this research
process, I overcome the initial phase of struggling with the concepts and formal definition
(see glossary) beyond the formal boundaries of disciplines, especially by reading and
exploring literature from sociology, psychology, and anthropology. The largest possible
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gap in the economist’s knowledge is the rigorous theory of social norms that largely
determines the economic outcomes. My work, although limited in its reach across the
disciplines, might help other researcher close the gap in both theory and empirics.
11

CHAPTER1
Social Norms, Women’s Status, and
Spousal Violence: Evidence from
India’s Northeast
Abstract
Conventional wisdom suggests patriarchal social norms hinder the well-being
and empowerment of women in the process of development. I investigate the link be-
tween social norms that define women’s status in society and spousal violence. The
empirical setting is India’s Northeast, where there is substantial variation regarding
patriarchal versus matriarchal customs. In my econometric analysis, I combine in-
formation on ancestral social norms from a comprehensive ethnographic atlas with
individual-level survey data on spousal violence. Consistent with the established
economic theories, the more female-empowering variants of the persistent antedilu-
vian social norms, such as easier divorce regime, non-residence with husband’s kin,
and matrilineal descent improve women’s reservation utility and bargaining power
within the extant marriages and curtail spousal violence and its acceptance. Ances-
tral female productive roles enhance women’s value in society and reduce spousal
violence.
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1.1 Introduction
There has been substantial progress in economic and human development over the last
two decades around the world, especially in Asia (World Bank, 2017), but violence against
women continues to be a global problem. In high-income countries and Europe, the inci-
dence of spousal violence stands at 23% and 25%, respectively. The incidence of spousal
violence is even higher in Africa (37%), South and South-East Asia (38%) (World Health
Organization, 2013), and South Asia (41%) (Roy et al., 2019). These figures are at odds
with Sustainable Development Goals 5, which address gender equality. Apart from being
detestable, spousal violence has adverse bearings on women’s and children’s malnutrition
(Ackerson and Subramanian, 2008), higher child mortality (Koenig et al., 2010; Ahmed,
Koenig, and Stephenson, 2006; Jejeebhoy, 1998), adverse effects on women’s employment
(Lindhorst, Oxford, and Gillmore, 2007; Staggs and Riger, 2005), and adverse physical,
mental, and sexual health outcomes (Carbone-López, Kruttschnitt, and Macmillan, 2006).
It also associates spousal abuse with malign consequences on women’s reproductive health
(García-Moreno et al., 2015; Salam, Alim, and Noguchi, 2006), higher gynecological mor-
bidity (Stephenson, Koenig, and Ahmed, 2006), and increased incidence of HIV (Jewkes
et al., 2010).
A body of extant research has addressed the determinants of spousal violence among
women. Devries et al. (2013) finds that spousal violence is spared from social critic which
leads to the perpetuation of spousal violence. The received work on contemporaneous
determinants and justification of spousal violence postulates cultural patterns and social
norms as an exogenous risk factor that perpetuates the peril (e.g., Dasgupta, 2019b;
Krause et al., 2016; Tran, Nguyen, and Fisher, 2016; Jayachandran, 2015; Yount et al.,
2013; Rani and Bonu, 2009), without estimating the effects of these social norms. There is
plenty of theoretical work and many case studies on the effect of social norms on women’s
well-being (e.g., Anderson, Bidner, and Sadania, 2017, 2020). However, except for Alesina,
Brioschi, and La Ferrara (2016, 2019), little is known, on how social norms ruling gender
relations in a society systematically affect women’s integrity in marriage.
In this paper, I estimate the long-run effects of ancestral female productive roles and
social norms on the ruling gender relations, spousal violence in particular. The empir-
ical setting is in the northeastern zone of India. Here many aboriginal groups live in
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ethnic isolation in a relatively small, politically homogeneous area. These ethnic groups
exhibit considerable variation in their marriage organization, divorce, descent and in-
heritance customs, and subsistence patterns. For spousal violence, I use individual-level
data from India’s National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3) carried out in 2005-06. For
ancestral norms, I use the ethnographic atlas People of India (Singh, 1998), a multi-
volume compendium, which presents qualitative abstracts on each ethnic group in India.
I systematically tabulate the ancestral subsistence patterns and social norms surrounding
marriage, separation, and inheritance for 92 aboriginal ethnic groups using the respec-
tive state series for the northeastern states (Dhamala et al., 1993; Dutta and Ahmad,
1995; Das and Imechen, 1994; Horam and Rizvi, 1998; Goswami, Nunthra, and Sengupta,
1995; Ganchaudhuri, Sailo, and Datta, 1996; Pakem, Roy, and Basu, 1994; Bardoloi and
Athaparia, 2003). The empirical innovation of this paper is to tabulate this qualitative
information systematically, comparable to the well-known ethnographic atlas by Murdock
(1967). I use the stated ethnic identity of the respondent in NFHS to combine the data
on spousal violence and other covariates with the social norms data of the ethnic group
coded from the People of India. Further, I georeference each aboriginal ethnic group
to assemble the environmental data showing relative suitability of subsistence patterns
from the data provided by Beck and Sieber (2010). The resultant novel dataset permits
analysis of ancestral predictors of spousal violence. Using a cross-sectional approach, I
estimate the effect of the ancestral female productive roles and social norms prevailing in
her ethnic group on the lifetime experience of spousal violence for women. Furthermore, I
control for a host of variables at individual, ethnic group, and environmental levels. The
principal estimations are conducted in a sample close to 6,400 married women and 4,400
married men from 92 ethnic groups.
The main findings are as follows. First, regarding ancestral female participation in
productive roles, societies where women are traditionally productive exhibit less incidence
of sexual atrocities. Second, matrilineal descent significantly reduces the experience of
physical and sexual violence and corresponds with roughly a 25 percent reduction in the
average number of atrocities ever experienced by a married woman. The endorsement of
spousal violence is less among matrilineal men. Third, regarding separation norms, in
societies where an easier divorce regime is prevalent, women are prone to justify violence,
and men justify violence less. Fourth, regarding post-marital residence norms, I find no
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statistically significant association.
The pattern of these results conveys two fundamental lessons. First, productive women
have greater reservation utility, which curtails spousal violence. Second, the wife’s reser-
vation utility is greater where social norms favor the elevated status of women. Hence a
greater balance of power within the marriage for women is conducive to protecting them
from spousal violence. Consistent with received theories of the marriage, these results
suggest that increased productive roles of women enhance the well-being of women, and
the persistence of pro-women social norms minimize the ill-being of women. Alterna-
tively phrased, these empirical results carry wider implications for women’s welfare in the
process of economic development.
This paper contributes to three strands of literature. The first one is on the an-
cestral determinants of spousal violence. Tur-Prats (2019) in her study in Spain shows
that societies where joint families (families where two or more generations co-reside) are
traditionally predominant, women experience less spousal violence due to their produc-
tive contribution in agriculture. In the developing country context, Leyaro, Selaya, and
Trifkovic (2017) estimate the cultural roots of spousal violence, exploiting the variation
in characteristics of traditional subsistence livelihoods. They find that women in sea-
fishing communities in Tanzania are better equipped to decide, more independent and
less vulnerable to spousal violence than in lake-fishing communities. More related to my
approach, Alesina, Brioschi, and La Ferrara (2019) use an empirical approach and data
for Sub-Saharan Africa that are like mine. However, they focus primarily on the effect of
women’s economic value in traditional agricultural production on contemporary spousal
violence and less on traditional marriage and descent norms. Furthermore, their empir-
ical strategy is somewhat limited, as they estimate the effect of social norms on spousal
violence individually. My contribution to this strand of literature is threefold. First, I
consider a comprehensive set of marriage norms (detailed in Data appendix). Second, I
control for a larger set of additional variables in my estimations, and conduct a multi-
variate regression analysis, which strengthens the econometric viability of my findings.
Third, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study of its kind in a South Asian
context, where women’s status is unusually vulnerable, and spousal violence is higher in
international comparison.
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The second quickly growing literature that this paper speaks to examines the ef-
fects of ancestral characteristics on various current development outcomes (e.g., Bau,
2019; Anderson, 2018; Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn, 2018; Michalopoulos, Putterman,
and Weil, 2019; Moscona, Nunn, and Robinson, 2017; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou,
2013; Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn, 2013; Nunn and Qian, 2011; Nunn and Wantchekon,
2011), the effects of the ancestral division of labor on contemporary women’s participation
in the workforce (Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn, 2013; Baiardi, 2016), the effects of ances-
tral customs on women’s education outcomes (Ashraf et al., 2020), the effects of women’s
traditional gender roles in productive activities on their value in the society (Becker, 2020;
Xue, 2018; Carranza, 2014, 2012, 2011; Qian, 2008). These studies, and many others, rely
on ethnographic characteristics from Murdock (1967). To my knowledge, this paper is the
first to tap a valuable and systematic ethnographic source undetected by economists, the
People of India. I show the long-term effects of the ancestral marriage norms, where the
effects conform to well-established theoretical mechanisms. Ancestral norms of several
divorce regimes — not coded in Murdock’s atlas — is novel.
My third contribution is the economic literature on the legal reforms of divorce laws
in developing countries. Regarding marriage dissolution norms more narrowly, in most of
the extant literature, the study object is legal change in high-income countries’ divorce
legislation or cross-sectional variation in divorce laws. For example, unilateral divorce
(Rasul, 2006) and the link between unilateral divorce and labor supply (Gray, 1998).
Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) examine the inter-linkages among unilateral di-
vorce, property division, enforcement of alimonies, and consideration of professional and
academic degrees and labor supply. Divorce laws can affect divorce rates (Peters, 1986;
Friedberg, 1998; Wolfers, 2006). However, the link between spousal violence and divorce
legislation is ambiguous and contradictory (Dee, 2003; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2006). I
make two contributions to this strand of literature. First, instead of modern legal reforms,
I consider ancestral divorce norms. Second, in my identification strategy, I control not
only for individual characteristics of respondents but also for ancestral structural eco-
nomic characteristics, in particular subsistence patterns, environmental characteristics,
and settlement patterns.
I organize the rest of the paper as follows. After presenting a conceptual framework, I
propose hypotheses in Section 1.2. In Section 1.3, I describe the data and its construction.
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Section 1.4 outlines the empirical approach, and I discuss the results in Section 1.5. In
Section 1.6, I perform robustness checks and heterogeneous analyses before concluding in
Section 1.7.
1.2 Conceptual framework and hypotheses
Existing non-cooperative bargaining models of spousal violence predict that an increase
in women’s empowerment through ancestral productive roles and supportive social norms
will decrease the occurrence of violence (Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 1997). In their non-
cooperative model, husbands maximize utility through violence and income transfer sub-
ject to the wife’s reservation utility (the minimum exogenous utility outside the marriage),
where a wife’s utility includes husband’s utility. If the marital utility of the spouses falls
short of their reservation utility, the marriage dissolves. Such divorce should prevent
spousal violence from a discontinued unfortunate marriage. In the extant marriage, the
husband refrains from violent behavior since he is aware of the reservation utility of the
wife. The comparative static properties suggest that the increase in husband’s income can
enable him to “buy” more violence by increasing income transfer to the wife. Through
an increase in the wife’s income from her economic roles, the husband reduces violence.
Otherwise, her reservation utility is breached, and she ends the marriage. Farmer and
Tiefenthaler (1997) write, “[a]nything that raises the women’s utility outside of the mar-
riage [...] will increase the probability that she leaves and, therefore, lower the level of
violence if she stays". Within this broader benchmark theoretical model, I include so-
cial norms (such as non-patrilocal residence, ease of divorce, and matrilineal descent)
and ancestral productive roles that increase their earning potential and, I develop four
inter-related hypotheses.
For the first hypothesis, I test concerns the effects of ancestral female productive roles
in a subsistence economy on the current incidence of and attitude towards spousal violence.
Economically productive women are more valued and enjoy greater social dignity. It
leads to the evolution of women-favoring social norms that persist until today (Alesina,
Giuliano, and Nunn, 2013), which can reduce spousal violence (Alesina, Brioschi, and
La Ferrara, 2019). Higher economic independence owing to their productive roles can
improve women’s reservation utility, and intra-household allocations are more aligned
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to her preferences (Lundberg and Pollak, 1996) and reduce spousal violence. Higher
female participation in agriculture also predicts lower spousal violence (Tur-Prats, 2019).
Ancestrally productive women have greater self-worth, and their rationality constraints
are such that they will either not tolerate or be less supportive of spousal violence (Aizer,
2010). Husbands recognize the worth of ancestrally productive women1 and perceive the
need to preserve and protect women’s health and productivity (Alesina, Brioschi, and
La Ferrara, 2016). They will refrain from harming women or justifying violence to avoid
loss of women’s productive contribution to the subsistence. I include gender roles in the
subsistence economy that proxy for the economic value of women. If this hypothesis holds
good, I expect that ancestral female participation in agriculture and allied production
should reduce actual violence. Both spouses should exhibit their aversion towards spousal
violence and should not endorse spousal violence.
The next set of hypotheses intertwines the traditional living arrangement of a married
couple, lineage institutions, and ease of dissolution of marriage. The prior is present in
societies where the post-marital residence is patrilocal. In non-patrilocal residences, the
likelihood of external intervention by the kin and family member is greater (Tauchen,
Witte, and Long, 1991), which should reduce spousal violence. Women in non-patrilocal
societies have closer access to seek help from their kin and have greater social capital
(Robinson and Gottlieb, 2019). They should less justify spousal violence. The husbands
consider the non-monetary costs of external interventions (such as sanctions from the
society) while they maximize the expected utility (Tauchen, Witte, and Long, 1991).
Thus, men should display lesser proclivity towards violence attitude. Thus, in my second
hypothesis, I expect actual violence and attitude towards violence to be lower in non-
patrilocal residence.
In matrilineal societies, women have greater bargaining power, and men lack author-
ity over their wives and children (Lowes, 2020). Matrilineal descent endows women with
property rights, which reduce physical and emotional abuse (Oduro, Deere, and Catan-
zarite, 2015). The long-term expectation of resource entitlements for women in matrilineal
inheritance (Robinson and Gottlieb, 2019) can remove the gender disparity over genera-
tions, and women exhibit lesser justification of spousal abuse. The male authority over
1The gains from intra-household bargaining power by women may be unacceptable for some men
and can increase violence as a controlling instrument (Eswaran and Malhotra, 2011; Tauchen, Witte,
and Long, 1991). Men with such motives for the defense of male authority (Chin, 2012; Macmillan and
Gartner, 1999) and compulsive masculinity (Straus, 1976) can legitimize spousal violence.
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female erodes (Tran, Nguyen, and Fisher, 2016) as the distribution of authority shifts
away from husbands. Men in the matrilineal society work in the fields belonging to their
wives (Panda and Agarwal, 2005), and her matrilineal kin should not endorse spousal vi-
olence. Overall, I draw up the third hypothesis that actual violence and attitude towards
violence should be lower matrilineal societies.
In culturally conservative societies, the threat of divorce is costlier with the associated
social stigma and, therefore, need not be credible (Luke and Munshi, 2011; Srinivasan and
Bedi, 2007) for women to separate from an abusive marriage. Social norms that make
the threat of divorce more credible (Brassiolo, 2016) can transfer bargaining power to the
wife (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2006) and improve her reservation utility. The incidences
of spousal violence should be lower because divorce threats can dissuade husbands from
inflicting violence within extant marriages or because actual divorce will end the unfor-
tunate marriage and violence. In an easier and less costly divorce regime, the husband’s
endorsement of and engagement in wife beating reduces since he knows that his wife will
divorce if her utility falls below her reservation utility (Brassiolo, 2016).
All of these would not matter if the women loves her husband. Committed women
who love their abusive husbands (Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 1997) can justify certain wife
beating. Apart from the narrower context of all the four mechanisms described above, all
of those improve a woman’s reservation utility and shift the balance of power in favor of
women, reducing the unfavorable outcomes for women.
1.3 Data
I restrict my analysis to nationally representative cross-sectional data from the third wave
of the National Family and Health Survey (NFHS-3) for two reasons. First, the previous
rounds (NFHS-2 and NFHS-1) neither cover both men and women, their attitude to-
wards spousal violence, nor the types of violence. Second, for the fourth round (NFHS-4)
the stated ethnicities of the respondents are not publicly available. Each observations in
NFHS-3 has their self-reported ethnic identities. Using these ethnic names, I combine
both ethnographic and ecological data with the cross-sectional observation in NFHS-3 by
way of the following five broad procedures. First, the ethnic identity is available as text
data, which are largely ridden with spelling variations and spelling errors. For the 92 abo-
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riginal ethnic group names, I manually correct the spellings such that I can match NFHS
observations with their ethnicities. I collect 1,269 clan and sub-clan names (Appendix
Table 1.12) for the 92 aboriginal ethnic groups such that it can match more observa-
tions with their ethnicities. After running these extensive spelling correction modules
to homogenize the ethnic names identical to the ethnic names mentioned in the People
of India, I arrive at a 79 percent matched ethnicity sample, for both women and men
(see Table 1.1). Second, I code 30 ancestral social norms and subsistence patterns from
the qualitative abstracts on 92 ethnic groups from People of India. I merge this coded
ethnography with the NFHS data using the cleaned ethnic names. Appendix Table 1.11
describes the variations in of ancestral lifeways for both female and male sample. The
number of ethnic groups following any of the social norms is identical across the female
and male sample. Since many of these social norms are complementary to each other,
using variance inflation factors (Appendix Table 1.14), I use three social norms that de-
termine women’s relative status in the society. Third, using the description about their
ancestral geographic location for each 92 aboriginal ethnic groups, I georeference them
within the bounding box (Latitude: 22.89 — 28.91 and Longitude: 88.03 — 96.20) for
the northeastern zone of India. Appendix Table 1.13 presents the approximate geographic
coordinates and the source of indicative excerpts from People of India. Fourth, I merge
the predicted data from Beck and Sieber (2010) for suitability of soil and climate for four
major subsistence patterns using the georeference of each ethnic group. Following Becker
(2020), I construct three indicator variables that capture the suitability of soil and climate
for hunting-gathering, pastoralism, and animal husbandry relative to agriculture for my
analysis. The detailed methods for data construction are available in the data appendix.
I present the detailed definition, description, and construction procedure for dependent
and independent variables in Section 1.A to 1.D of the Appendix. I summarize the
dependent variables in Panel A of Table 1.2. For married women, I use three indicator
variables (‘violence ever’, ‘physical violence ever’, ‘sexual violence ever’), which are self-
reported lifetime incidences of spousal violence. The first row shows that thirty-nine
percent of married women have experienced at least one form of spousal violence in
their lifetime. It is close to the national average for India, which suggests the sample is
nationally representative. For married women aged 15 to 49, thirty-four percent of women
have experienced physical violence in their lifetime. Twelve percent of women experienced
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sexual violence. To measure the intensity of atrocities, I construct a ‘violence intensity
index’, which is a sum of distinct types of aggression. This index ranges from zero to four
since it captures none or more than one of the four violence indicators, namely‘emotional
violence’ (Panel B of Table 1.2), ‘less severe violence’, ‘severe violence’ (Panel C of Table
1.2), and ‘sexual violence’ (Panel D of Table 1.2). For both the women and men, I
construct an indicator variable called ‘violence attitude’. This variable take the value one
if the respondent (woman or man) believes that wife beating is justifiable in at least one
of the five circumstances (Panel E of Table 1.2).
Table 1.1: Matching of ethnic groups in NFHS to ethnic groups in People of India
Matching methods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female sample
Direct match by ethnic groups 7438 36.75% 76 82.61%
Match by clan or sub-clan names 8530 42.15% 81 88.04%
Match by spelling variations in ethnic groups 15520 76.69% 88 95.65%
Match by spelling variations in clan/sub-clans 16089 79.50% 92 100.00%
Not matched/ misspecifed 4149 20.50% ... ...
Male sample
Direct match by ethnic groups 4696 38.95% 73 79.35%
Match by clan or sub-clan names 5334 44.24% 76 82.61%
Match by spelling variations in ethnic groups 9218 76.46% 88 95.65%
Match by spelling variations in clan/sub-clans 9504 78.83% 92 100.00%
Not matched/ misspecifed 2552 21.17% ... ...
Cumulative
observations
Percentage
observations
Number
ethnicities
Percentage
ethnicities
Notes: NFHS-3 reports ethnic identity by households, women and men. For eight northeastern states of
India, there are 20,238 women (aged 15 to 49) and 12,056 men (aged 15 to 54). Using the state volumes
of People of India, I tabulate 30 social norms and subsistence patterns (see Annexure Table 1.11) for 92
aboriginal ethnic groups. I collect a comprehensive list of 1,269 clan or sub-clan names for these 92 ethnic
groups (see Annexure Table 1.12) for improved and accurate matching. I georeference each of these 92
ethnic groups using indicative information about their ancestral homelands (see Annexure Table 1.13).
The weighted sample mean shows that 45 percent of women and 30 percent of men
justify wife beating in at least one circumstance. This gender gap in acceptability of
wife beating is consistent with the literature (Jayachandran, 2015) and suggestive of
socially appropriate behavior (Schuler, Lenzi, and Yount, 2011; Schuler and Islam, 2008)
by women and under-reporting by men (Yount et al., 2013). To assess the degree to
which the respondent thinks it is justifiable to beat wives, I construct a violence attitude
index’, which sums the number of circumstances in which wife beating is justified. The
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weighted average number of the justifiable situation is 1.2 (out of 5) for women and 0.62
for men. These measures of attitude towards violence are causally meaningful predictors
of actual violence (Dasgupta, 2019a). Considering the possibility of under-reporting by
women in fear of reprisal in a patriarchal society, Table 1.2 suggests that spousal violence
is widespread despite several matriarchal societies populating my study area.
Many of these social norms and subsistence patterns are complementary to each other
and hence inter-related. To avoid multicollinearity problems, based on the variance infla-
tion factors (see Appendix Table 1.14), I select a set of five explanatory variables (ances-
tral female roles in agriculture, ancestral female roles in agriculture and allied production,
post-marital residence, ease of divorce, descent) and describe those in Panel A of Table
1.9. Panel B of Table 1.9 summarizes these explanatory variables, nine contemporary con-
trol variables (age, education, household size, nuclear family dummy, wealth index, rural
residence dummy, family history of parental violence dummy, alcoholic partner dummy,
and altitude higher than 1,000 meters dummy), four religion fixed effects, eight control
variables at the ethnic group level (ancestral subsistence on agriculture, gathering, hunt-
ing, fishing, husbandry, pastoralism, settlement patterns, community land ownership),
and two ecological control variables at georeferenced ethnic group levels (suitability of
soil and climate for hunting-gathering and pastoralism relative to agriculture). Panel
B of Table 1.9 illustrates that the central tendencies for both female and male samples
are comparable, except for age, education, and the wealth index. The average age of
men is thirty-seven years, and the average age of women is thirty-one years. Men have
greater years of education. The randomly selected female respondents are from relatively
wealthier households than male respondents. The average prevalence of ancestral charac-
teristics is similar for men and women because these measures are at ethnic group levels
(Panel C of Table 1.9). For ecological variables at georeferenced ethnic group levels, the
suitability of soil and climate for agriculture is greater for men (36 percent) than women
(28 percent). I construct two suitability measures for hunting-gathering and pastoralism
relative to agriculture (Panel D of Table 1.9) since animal husbandry is not suitable for
agriculture in my entire study area. I account for the missing number of observations for
each of the data restrictions in Table 1.10, which explains the sample size used in the
regression analysis.
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics of dependent variables
Female sample Male sample
Mean Min Max Obs. Mean Min Max Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Violence ever 0.39 0.49 0 1 7626 - - - - -
Violence intensity index 0.67 1.02 0 4 7628 - - - - -
Physical violence ever 0.34 0.47 0 1 7628 - - - - -
Sexual violence ever 0.12 0.33 0 1 7628 - - - - -
Violence attitude (dummy) 0.45 0.50 0 1 7628 0.30 0.46 0 1 5094
Violence attitude index 1.19 1.59 0 5 7628 0.62 1.13 0 5 5094
Spouse has ever humiliated 0.09 0.29 0 1 7626 - - - - -
Spouse has ever threatened to harm 0.05 0.22 0 1 7627 - - - - -
0.06 0.24 0 1 7626 - - - - -
0.12 0.32 0 1 7625 - - - - -
Spouse ever slapped 0.32 0.47 0 1 7628 - - - - -
0.10 0.30 0 1 7628 - - - - -
Spouse ever kicked or dragged 0.08 0.27 0 1 7628 - - - - -
Spouse ever tried to strangle or burn 0.02 0.15 0 1 7628 - - - - -
0.02 0.14 0 1 7628 - - - - -
0.11 0.32 0 1 7627 - - - - -
0.12 0.32 0 1 7628 - - - - -
0.05 0.22 0 1 7628 - - - - -
0.15 0.36 0 1 7501 0.05 0.23 0 1 5068
0.39 0.49 0 1 7538 0.22 0.42 0 1 5043
Std.
Dev.
Std.
Dev.
A. Dependent variables
B. Ever any episode of emotional violence
Spouse has ever insulted or made
feel bad
C. Ever any episode of physical violence
Spouse ever pushed, shook or threw
something
Spouse ever punched with fst or
something harmful
Spouse ever threatened or attacked
with knife/gun or other weapon
Spouse ever twisted her arm or pull
her hair
D. Ever any episode of sexual violence
Spouse ever physically forced sex
when not wanted
Spouse ever forced other sexual acts
when not wanted
E. Components of violence attitude index
(a)Economic triggers
Wife beating justifed if she burns
the food
Wife beating justifed if she neglects
the children
(b) Social triggers
(continued..)
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0.27 0.44 0 1 7417 0.16 0.37 0 1 5007
0.13 0.33 0 1 7328 0.06 0.23 0 1 4983
0.27 0.44 0 1 7540 0.13 0.33 0 1 5042
Wife beating justifed if she argues
with him
Wife beating justifed if she refuses
to have sex with him
Wife beating justifed if she goes out
without telling him
Notes: Panel B enumerates 3 situations which are classified into emotional violence. NFHS-3 asks 7
questions about ‘less severe physical violence’ and ‘severe physical violence’, which are grouped together
into physical violence (Panel C). For ‘violence index ever’ all 4 categories, namely, emotional, severe,
less severe, and sexual violence are considered. Panel D shows the 2 situations indicating incidence of
sexual violence. Both women’s and men’s questionnaire asks about 5 situations in which the respondents
justify wife beating comprising the violence attitude index (Panel E). As in Alesina et al. (2019), these
are classified in (a) economic triggers (relating to gender specialization in subsistence economy) and (b)
social triggers (relating to social norms). Sample covers currently married women aged 15 to 49 who
are randomly selected and are successfully interviewed. Men aged 15 to 54 who are currently married
comprise the men’s sample. Reference period is during the lifetime for both women and men. Analytic
weights are applied, which are inversely proportional to the variance of an observation.
1.4 Empirical specification
In an important work, Lori Heise (1998) structured socio-ecological risk factors for spousal
violence into four groups, namely personal history, microsystem, exosystem and macrosys-
tem. The individual (personal history) factors include witnessing marital violence in
childhood, childhood abuse, or father’s absence during upbringing. The situational or
microsystem factors include male dominance, male control of wealth, and alcohol con-
sumption. Low socioeconomic status, social isolation of women are the exosystem factors
that entail spousal violence. Various cultural values comprise the macrosystem factors,
including the masculine notion of dominance, inflexible gender roles at the individual and
societal level, a sense of entitlement or women ownership among men, and cultural ap-
proval of punishing women in a certain context. The vast empirical literature focuses on
a variety of individual, family, and society-level risk factors to spousal violence (Koenig
et al., 2006; Flake, 2005; Bates et al., 2004; Jewkes, Levin, and Penn-Kekana, 2002; Koenig
et al., 1999; Straus and Hotaling, 1980). Incorporating the contemporaneous determi-
nants, I estimate the following equation compatible with the broad ecological framework
proposed by Heise (1998):
Pr(Vi = 1) = Φ(αs + βXe,i + γΓi + δQe,i), (1.1)
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where Φ is a normal cumulative density function and Pr is probability. I estimate the
outcome variable Vi using Probit model when it is a binary indicator variable, namely,
the self-reported lifetime experience of any spousal violence, physical spousal violence and
sexual spousal violence, and violence attitude for the ith individual. When Vi represents
an index (count variable), such as the violence intensity index and violence attitude index,
I estimate a Poisson model. αs represents a vector of fixed effects for eight Indian north-
eastern states and four major religions, Xe,i represents five dummy explanatory variables,
namely, ancestral female participation in agriculture, agriculture and allied production,
non-patrilocal post-marital residence, ease of divorce, and matrilineal descent for individ-
ual i belonging to ethnic group e. Γi represents a vector of current controls, including, age,
education, household size, nuclear family dummy, wealth index, rural residence dummy,
family history of parental violence dummy, alcoholic partner dummy, altitude higher than
1,000 meters dummy. Qe,i indicates ancestral characteristics of individual i belonging
to ethnic group e. These include ancestral subsistence, settlement, and land-ownership
patterns. It also includes two exogenous measures of ecological controls, namely, the
suitability of soil and climate for hunting-gathering and pastoralism relative to agricul-
ture sourced from Beck and Sieber’s (2010) estimates of grid-cell level average suitability
(climate and soil conditions) of four basic land use types (hunting-gathering, agriculture,
sedentary animal husbandry, and nomadic pastoralism) using Ecological Niche Modeling.
I report the average marginal effects of explanatory variables (β) interpreted as a change
in Vi for a discrete change in Xe,i from its reference category. In line with my description
in Section 1.2, I hypothesize that the explanatory variables of interest will reduce the
incidence and acceptance of spousal violence (i.e., β is smaller than zero).
1.5 Results
I estimate the Probit model where the outcome is an indicator variable (corresponding
to columns 1, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of Table 1.3 and 1.4). Where the outcome variable is count
variable (columns 2, 6, and 8 of Table 1.3 and 1.4), I estimate a Poisson model. For both
Probit and Poisson models, I report marginal effects for explanatory variables. Besides,
I report the number of ethnic group clusters and the mean of the dependent variable for
the estimation sample to assess the size of the estimated average marginal effects.
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First, I focus on the ancestral productive roles of women, which are implicit in their an-
cestral productive participation in their subsistence economy, (a) agriculture, and (b) agri-
culture and allied production activities (husbandry, fishing, weaving, basketry). Where
women ancestrally take part in economically productive activities, they are well regarded
in society, enjoy greater economic independence, and should gain equal status. The qual-
itative pattern of results in Table 1.3, for ancestral female participation in agriculture, is
consistent with this interpretation, as the estimated coefficients appear negative for all
forms of actual violence. There is about a six percent reduction in the likelihood of sexual
violence (Column 4 in Table 1.3) — the only effect that is statistically significant at the
5 percent level. This is a large effect making up about 50 percent of the mean. This
finding is in the spirit of the recent empirical application. For example, wives who live
with their mothers-in-law can contribute more to agricultural work and experience less
violence (Tur-Prats, 2019). Further, the social dignity of ancestrally productive women
can shape women-favoring attitudes and leads to a lesser incidence of spousal violence.
However, I do not find a statistically significant association regarding the violence atti-
tude measures for women and men in my sample. With the alternative estimation method
(logit), the association between ancestral female productive roles and the occurrence and
endorsement of violence is no longer discernible (see Table 1.5). The sensitivity to the
estimation methods makes me reluctant to draw a strong conclusion on these effects.
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Most ethnic groups in my sample (83 percent) are patrilocal, where the ancestral
social norms prescribe that after marriage, the couple lives with the husband’s kin and
family members. Co-residence with the husband’s family and kin can disempower the
wife. When couples follow matrilocal customs, women have closer access to their clan
members and more empowered (Robinson and Gottlieb, 2019). In neo-local residence,
the relative positions of husband and wife would be neutral in terms of access to positions
of power from their respective clan and family. Therefore, in non-patrilocal residences
(matrilocal and neo-local), husbands endorse less violence, and women justify violence
less. With the probability of intervention greater in non-patrilocal residence, the balance
of power in favor of women should lower the occurrence of violence. While no statistically
significant relationship emerges for the residence patterns variable, it is consistent with
the previous empirical literature. Across Africa, Alesina, Brioschi, and La Ferrara (2016)
find no statistically significant association between residence norms and spousal violence.
Although my sample is smaller relative to the African sample, 83 percent of respondents
are patrilocal in northeastern India, compared to 85 percent in Africa. This rationalizes
my conclusion on the lack of association between residence patterns and spousal violence.
Kinship institutions drive both the customs regarding marital residence and descent.
Since I find no evidence from the residence patterns, I explore whether descent norms
can explain spousal violence. Implicit in matrilineal descent, inheritance goes through
female line, which should lead to a gain in bargaining power for women both within the
household and outside in the society, and thus, reduce the occurrence of violence. I find
an eight percent reduction in the likelihood of sexual violence (Column 4 in Table 1.3)
among descendants of matrilineal ethnic groups. This effect is statistically significant at
the 1 percent levels. The magnitude of this effect is large compared to the mean. Also, the
fifteen percent reduction in the intensity of violence (Column 2 in Table 1.3) reinforces the
support to my hypothesis that the shift in the balance of power inherently favors women.
The magnitude and statistical significance for both these marginal effects are invariant to
estimation methods. Consistent with my hypothesis, I attribute these welfare-enhancing
effects to matrilineal property rights of women, which should increase women’s bargaining
power (Lowes, 2020). Women’s empowerment through ownership of real assets proxies
higher bargaining power for women, which leads to a lower incidence of physical violence
in Ecuador and lower emotional abuse in Ghana (Oduro, Deere, and Catanzarite, 2015).
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A similar prediction is available for India (Panda and Agarwal, 2005).
The lower endorsement of spousal violence either by the wife or by the husband lead
to lower odds of spousal violence. For the female sample, both the measures of atti-
tude towards violence (Columns 5 and 6 in Table 1.3) indicate negative marginal effects,
although these effects are not statistically significant. The qualitative interpretation sup-
ports my hypothesis that women’s entitlement to the property via matrilineal inheritance
is associated with lesser acceptance of spousal violence among women. Regarding men’s
behavior in matrilineal ethnic groups, I find the distribution of authority (over his wife
and children) shifts away from the husbands who work in the field owned by their wives.
This decrease in male authority over female behavior (Tran, Nguyen, and Fisher, 2016)
should reduce the proclivity for husbands to inflict violence and a seven percent reduction
in their endorsement of wife beating (Column 7 in Table 1.3). The estimated marginal
effects for the violence attitude index are thirty percent lower, which is very large and
about one-fourth of the mean. The husband’s lower endorsement can also originate from
the socially desired response in the survey (Yount et al., 2013), where matrilineal men
fearing reprisal do not endorse wife beating.
Finally, I consider the customary norms regarding divorce as an exogenous determinant
of spousal violence and test whether easier divorce regimes improve women’s well-being.
When considering this relationship, among the four realizations for divorce norms, it is
intuitively appealing to consider mutual consent divorce is easier than the other three
regimes as reference category (civil court divorce, society/family-approved divorce, and
discouraged divorce regimes). This marginal effect for this dichotomous variable called
‘ease of divorce’ displays a relatively larger reduction in men’s attitudinal index, by twenty-
six percent (Column 7 in Table 1.3). It comes with a ten percent reduced endorsement
of atrocities admitted by the husbands (Column 8 in Table 1.3). Apart from statistical
significance, these effects are economically meaningful and consistent with the theoretical
predictions. With an easier, cheaper, and credible divorce regime, husband’s incentive
to endorse violence is lower since he knows that wife can dissolve the marriage if her
utility falls below the reservation utility. Examining a divorce law reform in Spain that
reduced the costs of divorce, Brassiolo (2016) estimates a thirty percent reduction in
spousal violence, suggesting the role of bargaining position within the marriage because
of cheaper and credible divorce laws. With a greater incidence of divorce in northeastern
30
states than in the rest of India (Jacob and Chattopadhyay, 2016), women are aware of
things that can be and cannot be bargained over. With curtailed bargaining agency,
women accept male authority and justify twenty-three percent more wife beating. This
effect is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Women who are committed to a
violent relationship can resign themselves to accept a wife beating to some extent for the
love of the abusive husband (Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 1997).
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In Table 1.4, I estimate the regressions in Table 1.3 with a composite “Women’s
entitlement index”. This index comprises the three social norm dummy variables, and
therefore the index ranges between zero and three. The index takes the value zero if
these social norms dummy variables are zero, reflecting patriarchic residence, divorce, and
descent norms. If at most one of the three social norms dummy variables takes the value
one, then the index takes the value one. The index takes the value two if any two of the
three social norm dummy variables takes the value one. The matriarchy prevails when the
residence, divorce, and descent norms are pro-female, and the index takes the value three.
Essentially, this index derives an ordinal score for women’s entitlement in society and ranks
them along the complete spectrum from patriarchic to matriarchic tenets. It is realistic to
use the composite index since, for the intermediate values of the index (i.e., one and two),
the index flexibly accommodates prevalence or absence of any combination of the three
women-favoring social norms. The results in Table 1.4 suggests an important pattern that
women’s wellbeing improves monotonically with the increasing women’s entitlement in a
society. In particular, the spousal violence is twenty-eight percent less intense (Column
2 in Table 1.4 and 1.6) in societies that have pro-women residence, divorce, and descent
norms. The extent of reduction in the likelihood of sexual violence is three percent
in societies that has one woman-favoring social norms, which reduces by ten percent
when societies are at their matriarchal maximum. In such matriarchal societies, men
endorse thirty-two percent lesser violence. Women’s ill-fare also reduces as the matriarchal
tendencies in a society increase. For example, in societies where any two of the three pro-
female norms prevail, the odds of physical violence is about eight percent. This effect
completely decays as the societies follow a higher women-friendly social norm. Similarly,
women’s endorsement of spousal violence loses its statistical significance when her society
is fully matriarchal as opposed to a more patriarchal society. These findings underline
the preceding hypotheses that women-favoring social norms endow higher social regard
for women, which improves women’s reservation utility and reduces the threat towards
their physical and sexual integrity within the extant marriages.
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As a robustness check, I re-estimate the model specified in equation (1) using a logit
model for the dichotomous dependent variables, and a negative binomial model for count
variables (Table 1.5 and 1.6). I did this because both the variables violence intensity index
and violence attitude index are over-dispersed (variance is larger than mean), which vio-
lates the equidispersion assumption of the Poisson model. I conduct a likelihood ratio test
comparing the negative binomial model to a Poisson model. The associated chi-squared
values2 suggest that the negative binomial model is more appropriate than the Poisson
model. The estimated average marginal effects are robust to the choice of estimation
techniques.
1.6 Heterogeneous analyses
In this section, I explore the heterogeneous differences in incidence and acceptance of
spousal violence between urban and rural areas. The motivation behind the rural-urban
heterogeneous analysis is two-fold: (a) the urban areas resemble the modern society more,
which should underline the importance of the faster transition from traditional customs,
(b) in rural areas the influence of formal legal institutions from the national political
institutions should be weaker. I re-estimate the regressions of Table 1.3 separately by
rural and urban samples in Table 1.7. Overall, the magnitudes of marginal effects and
their levels of statistical significance are in line with the principal findings. Regarding
women’s economically productive roles, ancestral female participation in agriculture is the
principal driver of lower violence in villages. In urban areas, ancestral female productive
roles, besides agriculture, reduces violence. These results do not stem from differences in
the attitudes of men. Furthermore, non-residence of women with her husband’s family is
one of the few explanatory variables for which the results on women’s and men’s attitudes
do not go in the same direction. The socially desirable responses and reporting bias can
explain this anomaly. Another possibility is that men in urban areas tend to endorse
violence less; it is condemned in a more modern society. Urban women lacking the social
capital of kin networks may be more accepting of violence.
2For the female sample, the Chi-squared value with degrees of freedom one is 287.97 and 464.94 for
violence intensity index and violence attitude index, respectively. For the male sample, the Chi-squared
value with degrees of freedom one is 384.83 violence attitude index. All of these indicate that ‘alpha’ is
non-zero.
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Compared to the rest of India, the dissolution of marriage is higher in the northeastern
states of India, with a four percent divorce rate in Mizoram and three percent separation
rates in Meghalaya (Jacob and Chattopadhyay, 2016) owing to matriarchal of social norms
(Leonetti and Nath, 2009). It is the noteworthy feature that ease of divorce predicts men
displaying lesser acceptance of violence, and the effects are comparable across rural and
urban populations. Although rural women justify a certain extent of violence, urban
women do not — since in modern society, they are more empowered — which leads to the
lesser intensity of actual violence experienced by them. Matrilineal descent norms predict
reduced violence way more than ease of divorce norms, and these effects are quantitatively
larger in urban than in rural areas. This suggests that better inheritance rights, at more
advanced stages of the society, is more welfare enhancing for women (Agarwal, 1994,
1997).
When I bundle all the three the women-favoring social norms, the average marginal
effects are consistent with the initial findings, both in terms of their magnitudes and
statistical significance (Table 1.8). Because I split the sample between rural and urban,
it limits the estimates to a lower number of observations. I lose power for intermediate
values of the index, and these estimates may have some problems of perfect prediction.
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1.7 Conclusion
I investigate the effect of ancestral way of life of an individual’s ethnic group on the
contemporaneous occurrence of spousal violence and attitude towards it. I handpick the
study area that offers a considerable variation in terms of patriarchic and matriarchic so-
cial norms. This small and administratively homogeneous area in the northeastern zone of
India almost mimics an ethnological laboratory with many ethnic groups living in ethnic
isolation. I establish that the ancestral social norms and the traditions of female partic-
ipatory roles in economic activities — which are persistent — factor out environmental
effects and demographic characteristics on extreme marital distress. First, the rural data
on women’s ancestral economic roles reveal five percent declines in the odds of sexual
atrocities. In urban areas, ancestrally productive women experience fourteen percent
fewer likelihood of lifetime spousal violence. Second, as with the living arrangements,
non-residence with the husband’s family has no discernible effect on spousal violence.
Third, I find suggestive evidence of a eleven percent decline in men’s endorsement of vio-
lence when easier and less costly dissolution of marriage are customary. Women in ethnic
groups that adopted divorce by mutual consent still tolerate certain degrees of violence,
although these estimates are imprecise. Fourth, I find a striking decline by around fifteen
percent in the intensity of spousal violence and eight percent reduction in sexual violence
in societies that matrilineal descent. I believe that this decline is driven by eight percent
fewer endorsement of violence by men. Finally, the proxy for women’s entitlement realisti-
cally reveals that increasing inclinations towards female friendly customs are increasingly
potent in eliminating atrocities against women.
These findings are open to wider interpretations. The fundamental lesson is that
women-favoring social norms endow higher social regard for women. The pro-female
ancestral norms lead to favorable outcomes for women because of both the enhanced
economic value of women and improved status of women in society. The theoretical
underpinning of this finding stems from the non-cooperative bargaining models of the
household. Women’s reservation utility increase with pro-women social constructions.
Theoretical predictions suggest that enhanced reservation utility should set the balance
of power more in favor of women, endowing them with greater bargaining power. Together,
there should be favorable intra-household distribution effects, which should curtail spousal
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violence and its endorsement. These principal findings empirically endorse the idea that
changes in family law might affect violence against women more favorably. In “modern
times, inheritance reforms that shift inheritance rights of real assets to women can partly
simulate the ancestral tradition of matrilineal descent. The next speculation on policy
front is to introduce an easier and less costly divorce law. Adoption of ‘no-fault’ divorce
can empower women to divorce abusive husbands and can also be a promising tool to
threaten credibly against any untoward atrocities against them. Aware of this potent
threat, men can refrain from inflicting unacceptable violence.
For causal interpretation of these estimates, I need two strong assumptions, (a) there
is no omitted variable bias, no variables are left out of my analysis which are correlated
either with the outcome variables or the explanatory variables, (b) there is no reverse
causality, that is causality does not run from outcome variables to the explanatory vari-
ables. Reverse causality is probably less of an issue for exogenous ethnic characteristics.
I acknowledge both the assumptions are difficult to meet, and it is difficult to control
for all potential confounders, even if I have included all the contemporaneous risk fac-
tors of spousal violence identified in the literature and control extensive factors at the
environment and ethnic group levels. Therefore, I refer to these estimates as conditional
correlations. These results need not be the last words on this important, difficult, and
policy-relevant link among spousal violence and social norms. The under-reporting of
spousal violence is well known and could have induced measurement errors. Future re-
search might consider dealing with the remaining methodological issues and extend the
work to the rest of India.
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Appendices to Chapter 1
1.A Definition and description of dependent variables
I describe the construction of dependent variables and the underlying survey questions
with their realizations in the data.
1. The women-level data on lifetime violence exposure are from the third wave of
NFHS. For the randomly selected women aged 15-49, the following twelve questions
are asked: (i) spouse has ever humiliated her, (ii) spouse has ever threatened her
with harm, (iii) spouse has ever insulted or made her feel bad, (iv) spouse ever
pushed, shook or threw something, (v) spouse ever slapped, (vi) spouse ever punched
with the fist or something harmful, (vii) spouse ever kicked or dragged, (vii) spouse
ever tried to strangle or burn, (ix) spouse ever threatened or attacked with knife/gun
or other weapons, (x) spouse ever twisted her arm or pull her hair, (xi) spouse ever
physically forced sex when not wanted, (xii) spouse ever forced other sexual acts
when not wanted.
2. The categorical variable named “violence ever” indicates whether the women have
experienced at least one of the above twelve episodes of violence.
3. The NFHS constructs the following four dummy variables “emotional violence ever”,
“less severe violence ever”, “severe violence ever”, and “sexual violence ever” if the
responses are affirmative in (a) questions (i) to (iii) above, (b) questions (iv) to (vii),
(c) questions (viii) to (x), and (d) questions (xi) and (xii), respectively. I construct
an index called “violence intensity index” which is a sum of these four categories
ranging between 0 and 4.
4. I restrict the analysis to two forms of aggression. First, I combine the categories
“less severe violence ever”, “severe violence ever” into “physical violence ever” which
is a dummy variable. Second, I use “sexual violence ever” as a categorical dependent
variable.
5. Both women and men are asked in NFHS if the respondent (women/men) believes
that spousal violence is justified in the following five circumstances: (i) wife goes
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out without telling her husband, (ii) wife neglects the house or the children, (iii)
wife argues with her husband, (iv) wife refuses to have sex with her husband, (v)
wife burns the food.
6. As the dependent variable, I construct a categorical variable called “violence atti-
tude” for both women and men. It equals one if the respondent believes that wife
beating is justified in at least one out of five circumstances.
7. From the sum of the five circumstances (outlined in (5) above) in which the respon-
dents believe that wife beating is justified, I construct a “Violence Attitude Index”
ranging between 0 and 5.
1.B Definition and description of independent vari-
ables
I use a set of contemporary control variables in all of my regression specifications to capture
the individual characteristics of both men and women, as available in NFHS-3. Variables,
such as age and education for both women and men are measured in years. The household
size variable indicates the number of persons lived in the household as of the previous
night before the data was collected. The dummy variables are nuclear family, rural, family
history of violence, alcoholic partner, and altitude of primary sampling unit higher than
1,000 meters. The wealth index is a categorical variable that measures of various indicators
available in the dataset are generated by using the principal component analysis which
places the respondent on the wealth distribution reflective of relative position in terms of
economic status depending on which of the five quintiles they belong to. This variable is
readily available in NFHS-3, which is calculated using data on a household’s ownership
of certain assets, the house construction material, and access to water and sanitation. To
capture unobserved heterogeneity between four religions and eight Indian northeastern
states, I control for religion and state fixed effects.
At ethnic group levels, I control for ancestral subsistence patterns. There are six ances-
tral subsistence on agriculture/gathering/hunting/fishing/husbandry/pastoralism reflect-
ing whether an ethnic group ancestrally depends on any of these subsistence activities.
The comparable variables in Murdock’s atlas present the extent (0% to 100%) to which an
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ethnic group is dependent on agriculture, gathering, hunting, fishing, animal husbandry.
In addition to these five indicator variables, I code a dummy variable called “ancestral set-
tlement patterns” equal to one if ethnic groups ancestrally had separated hamlets forming
a single community,semi-permanent neighborhoods of dispersed households, semi-nomadic
half-year/semi-nomadic settlements. Another categorical variable used as a control vari-
able is community land ownership, which equals to one if the land is ancestrally owned by
society/community and two if the ethnic group is ancestrally landless community. The
gender-roles in the ancestral subsistence economy are reflected in nine dummy variables
that equal one if ancestral female participation in agriculture, gathering, hunting, fishing,
husbandry, pastoralism, weaving, basketry, politics were present. For the georeferenced
locations of each ethnic groups, I construct three dummy variables that equal one if the
soil and climatic conditions are most suitable for hunting-gathering/husbandry/pastoral-
ism relative to agriculture. For eleven activities (metalworking, weaving, leather works,
pottery, boat building, house construction, gathering, hunting, fishing, animal husbandry,
agriculture) in Murdock’s ethnographic atlas, an ethnic group is grouped into nine cate-
gories: (i) males alone perform the activity, (ii) both sexes participate, (iii) differentiation
of specific tasks by sex but approximately equal participation, (iv) equal participation
by both sexes without marked or reported differences, (v) both sexes participate but fe-
males do appreciably more than males, (vi) females alone perform the activity, (vii) sex
participation irrelevant, (viii) the activity is present but sex participation is unspecified,
(ix) the activity is absent or unimportant in the particular society. In contrast, People
of India specifies in which of the activities women participate, but do not specify the ex-
tent of participation in a specific activity of interest, and thereby the extent of economic
contribution of female participation cannot be inferred.
1.C Definition and description of social norms
I describe the construction of explanatory variables from social norms and their respective
realizations.
1. Post-marital residence is a categorical variable. Patrilocal residence implies resi-
dence in a patrilineal group where bride goes and lives with his husband’s family
and kin, also referred to as virilocal is coded as zero. The next category is coded
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as one, which is Matrilocal or Uxorilocal. Such practices observe the couple to
reside with or near the female matrilineal family and kin of the wife. It is gener-
ally observed in a matrilineal society also referred to as uxorilocal. The ambilocal/
bilocal/neolocal/duolocal societies are coded as two where marital residence is estab-
lished optionally with or near the parents of either the husband or wife, depending
upon circumstances or personal choice.
2. Ease of divorce is a categorical variable that captures the following social norms
observed in different societies for granting divorce among the couples. Here a zero
represents civil court proceedings, where married couples approach a legal body
for divorce proceedings legally. Mutual consent divorce is when couples decide
to divorce by mutually, which is coded as one. In certain ethic groups, divorce is
permitted by the societal or the familial approval/agreement, which is coded as two.
The last category is where divorce rules are rigid and doesn’t permit the couples to
divorce is coded as three.
3. Matrilineal descent is a binary variable that is coded as 1 if the matrilineal descent is
practiced, where a person can be traced through the female line or female ancestors,
generally, female kin are descendants of the mother. Otherwise, the variable takes
a value of zero if the patrilineal descent is followed, which can be traced through
the male line. Male kin are selected to become the line of descent after the father.
1.D Data construction
The National Family and Health Survey of India covers women aged 15-49 and men aged
15-54 from the randomly selected households across India following the internationally
standardized questionnaires and sampling design of the Monitoring and Evaluation to
Assess and Use Results Demographic and Health Surveys (MEASURE DHS). A woman
is randomly selected for the household relations section of the women-only questionnaire
on spousal violence using a Kish grid (Kish, 1965) that has eight columns indicating
the total number of eligible women (numbered 1 to 8) in the household and ten rows
(numbered 0 to 9) for the last digit of the questionnaire number. Out of the national
sample of 109,041 households, 124,385 women aged 15-49, and 74,369 men aged 15-54, I
use a sub-sample of 20,238 women and 12,056 men for eight northeastern Indian states.
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1.D.1 People of India ethnographic atlas and matching with
NFHS
Economists popularly use (Nunn and Qian, 2011; Enke, 2019; Alesina, Giuliano, and
Nunn, 2013; Michalopoulos, Putterman, and Weil, 2019; Michalopoulos and Papaioan-
nou, 2013) the coded ethnographic atlas (Murdock, 1967). After exploring several other
coded ethnographic atlases (including Kirby et al., 2016; Gray, 1999; White et al., 1986;
Ember et al., 1992; Barry, 1980), I find none of those sufficiently cover the ethnic diversity
in India. Therefore, I identify People of India as an alternative to extract information
from the qualitative ethnography. The People of India is a multi-volume compendium
of books presented for each sub-national state within India covering 4,635 ethnic groups,
which was collected in a mammoth project ran by the Anthropological Survey of India
under the Indian ministry of culture during 1985-1992. Ethnographers spent an average
of 5.5 days with each community and recoded various aspects of traditional social norms
through first-hand interviews and with the help of the informants. This ethnographic
atlas is not yet popular among economists, despite offering greater coverage within In-
dia, probably for the qualitative nature of the information. I use a double-blind coding
protocol to extract information and to identify the presence or absence of various subsis-
tence patterns among the ethnic groups in my study area. I identify 92 aboriginal ethnic
groups for whom I can extract definitive information about the presence or absence of 5
modes of subsistence economy. The ancestral characteristics, customs, and social norms
at the ethnic group level are then assigned from the coded ethnography from the People
of India on each female and male observation. Following a double-blind coding protocol,
I code eight marriage customs (marriage payments, clan-exogamy, community-exogamy,
and village-exogamy, close kin marriageability, partner selection patterns, polygyny, and
post-marital residence), four separation norms (ease of divorce, alimony rights, custody,
ease of remarriage), three lineage norms (descent, inheritance, succession), six subsistence
patterns (dependence on agriculture, gathering, pastoralism, animal husbandry, hunt-
ing, fishing), the traditional use of plough in cultivation, nine gender division of labor
indicators (ancestral female participation in agricultural, gathering, fishing, hunting, an-
imal husbandry, pastoralism, weaving, basketry, and politics), settlement patterns, and
community land ownership. Appendix Table 1.11 summarizes the incidence of each of
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these 30 social norms and subsistence patterns. To combine NFHS observations with the
ethnographic data from People of India, I use the stated ethnicity of the respondent. The
recent NFHS conducted in 2015 (NFHS-4) does not provide the data file for ethnicity.
For NFHS conducted in 2005 (NFHS-3), the reported ethnic group affiliation is available
for men, women, and households. The reported ethnicity is available for the household
head in NFHS conducted in 1998 (NFHS-2), but it does not cover detailed incidence and
justification of spousal violence. Thus, I limit my analysis to NFHS-3 cross-sectional data.
It is important to highlight that the stated ethnic group names are recorded in the text,
which is not free from spelling errors. For spelling variations, most often, the stated ethnic
group names in NFHS do not coincide readily with the names of ethnic group names in
the People of India. The first step in the process is to identify a set of 92 ethnic groups
who are aboriginal inhabitants of northeastern states of India from the People of India
and code the qualitative and detailed ethnography for each of them. Building on the
matching procedure elaborated in the literature that combines Murdock’s ethnographic
data with the DHS data (e.g., Alesina, Brioschi, and La Ferrara, 2019; Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou, 2014), I develop a four-step matching procedure by reconciling the
differences in reported ethnicities in NFHS.
The most straightforward case is where the ethnic group name (text data) is identical
in spelling with the text name in the People of India. This trivial process yields 37%
women and 76 ethnicities for NFHS-3. The direct match is viable for 39% of men and
73 ethnic groups. To enhance the matched data with ethnic groups, I collect the clan
and sub-clan names for the 92 target ethnic groups from the People of India. After care-
fully studying the chapters on each of the 92 ethnic groups in respective state volumes
of People of India, I gather 1,269 clan and sub-clan names (Appendix Table 1.12). This
massive exercise widens the direct match possibilities because probably the reported eth-
nicities might have referred to the respondents’ clan or sub-clan affiliation rather than
the ethnic groups. On average, each ethnicity has 14 clans or sub-clans, with a maxi-
mum of 180 clans and sub-clans for ‘Tagin’ ethnic group, who are aboriginal inhabitants
of Arunachal Pradesh. Second, I conduct another direct match of stated ethnicity (text
data) with the collection of 1,269 clan and sub-clan names. For example, the ethnic
name “Angami” according to People of India is found in NFHS in terms of their clan and
sub-clan names (“Gnamei”, “Tsungumi”, “Tsungung”, “Mour”, “Chakroma”, “Tengima”,
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“Chakrama”, “Kezami”, “Memi”, “Dzunokehena”, “Zounuo”, “Keyhonuo”, “Khonoma”,
“Kezami”, “Khezha”, “Pezina”, “Pepfuma”, “Tepa”, “Thevo”, and “Kemovo”) who are
known to be kindred to the “Angami” people. This procedure cumulatively matches 42%
of women and 81 ethnic groups and 44% men with 76 ethnic groups. The third method is
manually correcting the spelling variation in the text data in NFHS for 92 ethnic names.
For instance, the stated ethnic names for “Chang” is misspelt in NFHS as “Cahng”,
“Chanh”, “Chnag”, or “Cjhang” to illustrate a few of the innumerable possibilities of
spelling errors. This laborious spelling correction, however, yields the maximum extent of
matches. Cumulatively, after the third method, 76% of women with 88 ethnic groups and
76% of men from 88 ethnic groups are identified. The fourth step is to manually synchro-
nize spelling variations for the 1,269 clan and sub-clan names. This most labor-intensive
step did not yield much of incremental matches. After this step, I can get 80% of women
and 79% of men from all the 92 ethnic groups. Table 1.1 presents the number of women
and men who were matched after each of the four matching methods. In the matched
data, there are 92 ethnic groups for both women and men. The womens sample is 16,089,
and the mens sample is 9,504. I present all the thirty social norms and subsistence pat-
terns in Appendix Table 1.11. Next, I merge these social norms and subsistence patterns
data with the demographic data based on the matched ethnicities of respondents. In table
1.7, I present the final sample that can be used in the analysis and account for missing
observations due to several data restrictions.
1.D.2 Combining environmental data with the matched ethno-
graphic NFHS data
The variation in the ancestral ecological conditions largely determine ancestral subsistence
patterns. These extra-environmental patterns are exogenous to the social norms, customs,
and ancestral subsistence patterns, unless ethnic groups self-select into particular pock-
ets, even within primary sampling units, with special environmental conditions that might
suit them the most. To overcome the omitted variable bias — if environmental factors
determine social norms — I control for these environmental conditions. NFHS data is not
georeferenced. I identify the approximate geographic locations of the 92 ethnic groups in
my sample. The minimum perimeter bounding box for the northeastern states of India
is between latitude (from 22.89 to 28.91) and longitude (from 88.03 to 96.20). I infer the
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geographic referencing of each ethnic group from the description of each ethnic group in
the respective chapter in the People of India. I give a greater reliance on a description of
their main area of settlement unless the districts, sub-districts, and specific villages are
mentioned. I present the excerpts and texts from the People of India chapters of a specific
ethnic group that are used to put each ethnic group on the map and assign proxy latitudes
and longitudes in Appendix Table 1.13. I use these approximate geographic coordinates
for adding soil suitability conditions to the merged data. I add the data provided by Beck
and Sieber (2010). They used long-run (1961-1991) average patterns in climatic condi-
tions (temperature, rainfall, altitude) and soil characteristics to predict which climate and
soil conditions suit most for the land-use types for four basic subsistence, such as, agricul-
ture, hunting-gathering, animal husbandry, and pastoralism. For each of these four land
suitability measures, I calculate mean and median at 20 kilometers, 50 kilometers, and
100 kilometers radii from the geographic coordinates of each ethnic group, as separate
variables and presented in Appendix Table 1.13. Following Becker (2020), I construct
three linearly independent indicator variables for whether the environment is most suited
for (a) hunting-gathering, (b) animal husbandry, (c) pastoralism, relative to agriculture,
since in my sample most of the ethnic groups are agrarian societies.
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Table 1.9: Summary statistics of explanatory variables and control variables
Female sample Male sample
Mean Min Max Obs. Mean Min Max Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ancestral female role: agriculture 0.64 0.48 0 1 7628 0.64 0.48 0 1 5100
0.06 0.23 0 1 7628 0.07 0.25 0 1 5100
Post-marital residency 0.21 0.49 0 2 7628 0.21 0.49 0 2 5100
0.83 0.38 0 1 7628 0.82 0.38 0 1 5100
Non-patrilocal residence 0.17 0.38 0 1 7628 0.18 0.38 0 1 5100
   Matrilocal/uxorilocal residence 0.13 0.34 0 1 7628 0.14 0.35 0 1 5100
   Neolocal residence 0.04 0.19 0 1 7628 0.04 0.19 0 1 5100
Matrilineal descent 0.12 0.33 0 1 7628 0.14 0.34 0 1 5100
Ease of divorce 0.43 0.49 0 1 7628 0.40 0.49 0 1 5100
0.41 0.49 0 1 7628 0.43 0.49 0 1 5100
Women's entitlement index=1 0.43 0.49 0 1 7628 0.43 0.49 0 1 5100
Women's entitlement index=2 0.11 0.31 0 1 7628 0.12 0.32 0 1 5100
0.05 0.22 0 1 7628 0.03 0.16 0 1 5100
Age (years) 31.27 7.81 15 49 7628 37.24 8.37 15 54 5100
Education (years) 5.01 4.56 0 21 7627 6.68 4.74 0 20 5098
Household size 5.06 1.96 1 20 7628 5.42 2.20 1 17 5100
Nuclear family (dummy) 0.32 0.47 0 1 7539 0.38 0.49 0 1 5024
Wealth Index (categorical) 3.27 0.47 1 5 7628 2.89 1.23 1 5 5100
Rural (dummy) 0.84 0.36 0 1 7628 0.83 0.37 0 1 5100
Family history of violence 0.21 0.41 0 1 6984 0.17 0.37 0 1 4687
Alcoholic partner 0.53 0.50 0 1 7626 0.58 0.49 0 1 5100
Hindu (dummy) 0.66 0.47 0 1 7628 0.67 0.47 0 1 5100
Muslim (dummy) 0.06 0.23 0 1 7628 0.03 0.17 0 1 5100
Christian (dummy) 0.23 0.42 0 1 7628 0.25 0.43 0 1 5100
Other religion (dummy) 0.04 0.21 0 1 7628 0.05 0.21 0 1 5100
0.12 0.32 0 1 7628 0.13 0.33 0 1 5100
Ancestral subsistence: agriculture 0.86 0.35 0 1 7628 0.85 0.36 0 1 5100
Ancestral subsistence: gathering 0.94 0.24 0 1 7628 0.94 0.23 0 1 5100
Std.
Dev.
Std.
Dev.
A. Explanatory variables: Ancestral female roles in subsistence and social norms
Ancestral female role: agriculture
and allied production
Patrilocal/virilocal residence
(reference category)
Women's entitlement
index(reference category:
patriarchic)
Women's entitlement index=3
(matriarchic)
B. Control variables: individual level
Altitude higher than 1000 m
(dummy)
C. Control variables: ethnic group level
(continued..)
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Ancestral subsistence: hunting 0.28 0.45 0 1 7628 0.31 0.46 0 1 5100
Ancestral subsistence: fshing 0.59 0.49 0 1 7628 0.62 0.49 0 1 5100
Ancestral subsistence: husbandry 0.53 0.50 0 1 7628 0.55 0.50 0 1 5100
Ancestral subsistence: pastoralism 0.32 0.47 0 1 7628 0.32 0.47 0 1 5100
0.54 0.50 0 1 7628 0.56 0.50 0 1 5100
0.97 0.18 0 1 7108 0.96 0.19 0 1 5100
0.62 0.49 0 1 7628 0.64 0.48 0 1 5100
0.01 0.09 0 1 7628 0.00 0.05 0 1 5100
0.28 0.45 1 7628 0.36 0.48 0 1 5100
0.62 0.49 1 7628 0.64 0.48 0 1 5100
0 0 0 0 7628 0 0 0 0 5100
Ancestral female role in agriculture 0.64 0.48 0 1 7628 0.64 0.48 0 0 5100
Ancestral female role in gathering 0.68 0.47 0 1 7628 0.66 0.47 0 1 5100
Ancestral female role in hunting 0.00 0.06 0 1 7628 0.01 0.09 0 1 5100
Ancestral female role in fshing 0.26 0.44 0 1 7628 0.27 0.45 0 1 5100
Ancestral female role in husbandry 0.29 0.45 0 1 7628 0.30 0.46 0 1 5100
0.01 0.08 0 1 7628 0.01 0.08 0 1 5100
Ancestral female role in weaving 0.41 0.49 0 1 7628 0.40 0.49 0 1 5100
Ancestral female role in basketry 0.19 0.39 0 1 7628 0.18 0.39 0 1 5100
Ancestral female role in politics 0.12 0.33 0 1 7628 0.11 0.32 0 1 5100
Ancestral separated settlement
patterns
Ancestral community land
ownership patterns
D. Control variables: geo-referenced ethnic group level
Soil and climate most suited for
hunting-gathering
Soil and climate most suited for
pastoralism
E. Variables transformed to include in regressions
Soil and climate most suited for
agriculture
Soil and climate most suited for
hunting-gathering
Soil and climate most suited for
husbandry
Ancestral female role in
pastoralism
Notes: The spatial prediction data on suitability of land of the georeference of ethnic group is obtained
from Beck and Seiber (2010) which are computed assuming only soil and climate affects soil-suitability
for four basic land use types using Ecological Niche Modeling. The most suitable land-use is constructed
three linearly independent indicator variables for whether (i) the environment is most suited for hunting
and gathering (48 ethnic groups) (ii) the environment is most suited for husbandry (no ethnic group and
not reported) (iii) the environment is most suited for pastoralism (1 ethnic group) with reference category
is “soil and climate most suited for agriculture" (43 ethnic group and reference category). The sample
composed of currently married women aged 15-49 who were randomly selected for the domestic violence
module and were interviewed with privacy ensured. Variables summarized in Panel E are not directly
used in regression analysis. Analytic weights applied, which are inversely proportional to the variance of
an observation.
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Table 1.10: Data restrictions and number of observations
Data restrictions Female sample Male sample
20238 12056
Restricted to matched ethnic groups 16089 9504
Restricted to unequivocally matched sample 15886 9290
Restricted to selected for domestic violence module 10942 not applicable
Restricted to woman selected and interviewed 10873 not applicable
Restricted to currently married 7628 5100
Restricted to coded social norms: post-marital residence 7628 5100
Restricted to coded social norms: descent 7628 5100
Restricted to coded social norms: ease of divorce 7628 5100
Restricted to coded ancestral subsistence - agriculture 7628 5100
Restricted to coded ancestral subsistence – gathering 7628 5100
Restricted to coded ancestral subsistence – hunting 7628 5100
Restricted to coded ancestral subsistence – fshing 7628 5100
Restricted to coded ancestral subsistence – husbandry 7628 5100
Restricted to coded ancestral subsistence – pastoralism 7628 5100
Restricted to coded ancestral settlement complexity 7628 5100
Restricted to coded ancestral community land ownership 7108 4851
Restricted to coded ancestral female role in agriculture 7108 4851
7108 4851
Restricted to age (years) 7108 4851
Restricted to education (years) 7107 4849
Restricted to household size 7107 4849
Restricted to nuclear family dummy 7028 4780
Restricted to wealth quintiles 7028 4780
Restricted to rural residence 7028 4780
Restricted to witnessed parental violence 6436 4415
Restricted to alcoholic spouse 6435 4415
Restricted to altitude higher than 1000 meters dummy 6435 4415
Restricted to relative suitability to hunting-gathering 6435 4415
Restricted to relative suitability to pastoralism 6435 4415
Restricted to state fxed efects 6435 4415
Restricted to religion fxed efects 6435 4415
Restricted to violence attitude 6435 4410
Restricted to ever any violence 6433 not applicable
Potential observations in NFHS-3(for 8 northeastern
states of India)
Restricted to coded ancestral female role in agriculture
and allied production
Notes: For each variable used in the regression a lower bound of observations are indicated which accounts
for the different number of observations in the regression tables.
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Table 1.11: Social norms and subsistence economy by ethnic groups
Female sample Male sample
Ethnicity Obs. Ethnicity Obs.
Social norms (1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Marriage payments 90 13331 90 7336
Neither brideprice nor dowry 18 2810 18 1107
Only brideprice 62 8911 62 5211
Only dowry 6 905 6 498
Both brideprice and dowry 4 705 4 520
2. Kinship, marriage, community organization 91 15702 91 9122
Clan endogamy 20 1538 20 663
Clan exogamy 71 14164 71 8459
Community endogamy 82 12805 82 7002
Community exogamy 9 2897 9 2120
Village endogamy 84 10766 84 5966
Village exogamy 7 4936 7 3156
3. Kinship, marriage 91 15860 91 9281
No consanguinity 39 9406 39 5610
52 6454 52 3671
4. Marriage, domestic organization 92 15860 92 9290
Monogamy 86 15044 86 8659
Polygyny 6 842 6 631
5. Marriage types 92 15886 92 9290
Arranged marriage 44 4107 44 2462
Love matches 5 3040 5 1170
Both arranged and love marriages 43 8739 43 5658
6. Post-marital residency norms 92 15886 92 9290
Patri/virilocal 72 11731 72 6703
6 2134 6 871
Neolocal 14 2021 14 1716
7. Divorce rules 92 15886 92 9290
Civil court divorce 6 982 6 396
Mutual consent 46 6924 46 3772
Society's/family's approval 23 2762 23 1687
Divorce is rare and discouraged 17 5218 17 3435
8. Alimony rights 92 15886 92 9290
No alimony after divorce 64 13146 64 7786
Alimony entitlement 28 2740 28 1504
9. Child custody rights 91 15766 91 9196
Father keeps 33 8797 33 5774
Mother keeps 10 2405 10 1087
Situational/either keeps 48 4564 48 2335
10. Remarriage norms 88 15382 88 8957
Not acceptable & rigid 3 2604 3 2033
Acceptable & fexible 85 12778 85 6924
11. Kinship: descent 92 15886 92 9290
Patrilineal 85 13867 85 8445
Matrilineal 7 2019 7 845
12. Wealth transactions: inheritance 91 15815 91 9264
Equigeniture 61 6537 61 3892
Male inheritance 23 7113 23 4575
First cousin(fsd/mbd)/sororate/levirate
Matri/uxorilocal/ambi/bi/duolocal
(continued..)
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Female inheritance 7 2165 7 797
13. Cultivation 89 15353 89 9098
Shifting cultivation 63 11302 63 6510
Wet/plough cultivation 26 4051 26 2588
14. Subsistence economy : agriculture 92 15886 92 9290
No  7 901 7 510
Yes 85 14985 85 8780
15. Subsistence economy : gathering 92 15886 92 9290
No  5 1168 5 839
Yes 87 14718 87 8451
16. Subsistence economy : hunting 92 15886 92 9290
No  58 8613 58 5392
Yes 34 7273 34 3898
17. Subsistence economy : fshing 92 15886 92 9290
No  48 5530 48 2956
Yes 44 10356 44 6334
18. Subsistence economy : animal husbandry 92 15886 92 9290
No  32 8284 32 4578
Yes 60 7602 60 4712
19. Subsistence economy : pastoralism 92 15886 92 9290
No  64 9252 64 4975
Yes 28 6634 28 4315
20. Subsistence economy, gender: agriculture 92 15886 92 9290
No female participation in agriculture 13 3075 13 1534
Yes 79 12811 79 7756
21. Subsistence economy, gender: gathering 92 15886 92 9290
No female participation in gathering 15 4423 15 1696
Yes 77 11463 77 7594
22. Subsistence economy, gender: hunting 92 15886 92 9290
No  female participation in hunting 91 15871 91 9279
Yes 1 15 1 11
23. Subsistence economy, gender: fshing 92 15886 92 9290
No  female participation in fshing 78 14254 78 8553
Yes 14 1632 14 737
24. Subsistence economy, gender: husbandry 92 15886 92 9290
No  female participation in husbandry 52 8646 52 5315
Yes 40 7240 40 3975
25. Subsistence economy, gender: pastoralism 92 15886 92 9290
No  female participation in pastoralism 89 15537 89 9138
Yes 3 349 3 152
26. Subsistence economy, gender: weaving 92 15886 92 9290
No  female participation in weaving 45 7957 45 4418
Yes 47 7929 47 4872
27. Subsistence economy, gender: basketry 92 15886 92 9290
No  female participation in basketry 70 13020 70 7516
Yes 22 2866 22 1774
28. Politics,leadership,gender 92 15886 92 9290
No female participation in politics 88 14539 88 8792
Yes 4 1347 4 498
29.  Land ownership patterns 92 15586 92 8724
(continued..)
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Private ownership of land 10 1519 10 1286
Society/community 72 13079 72 7438
Landless 8 988 8 445
30. Settlements patterns 92 15886 92 9158
Compact/relatively permanent 42 8724 42 5467
48 6854 48 3691
Semi-nomadic 1/2  year; or semi-sedentary 2 308 2 132
Separated hamlets/semi-permanent
neighborhoods
Notes: If a social norms that are not mentioned in the People of India ethnographic atlas, then it is coded
as missing, which is accounted for in Table 1.2 and regressions. For subsistence economy (variable 14-30)
is coded as zero if it is not mentioned in People of India, which is consistent with Murdock’s codes for the
relative of participation in subsistence by sex and percentage of dependence on subsistence economy.
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Table 1.12: List of clan or sub-clan names by 92 ethnic groups
Ethnic groups Clans/sub-clan names
Sikkim
Bhutia 27
5
Chetri 18
Gurung 28
Lepcha 10
32
Mangar 19
Rai 18
Sherpa 14
10
Tamang 37
Number
clans
Bhot Bhotia Drukpa Drukul Chumbipas Dhoptapas Trompas
Domupas Lachenpa Lachungpa Lhori Tondu Russhi Chechu
Thapa Shandarpa Kachopa Shengapa Beb Tsen Gye Gansapa
Namchangopa Chungiopa Ithenpa Phenchungpa Phenpunadik
Namnakpa Nachangpa
Bhujel Khawa Khusila Kashyap Kashi
Kshatriya Khas Bista Subadi Basnet Adhikari Nirula Bhandari
Paural Thorje Katwal Bhattarai Thapa Andari Karki Kami
Damai Sarki
Gurkhali Ghale Ghonde Lama Lamichane Ghyabre Kyabchne
Kurumchhe Jangre Aring Dorjali Rilami Poju Chormi Pom
Thin Migi Khatra Yog Paingi Kholali Sogun Thorjami Tu
Puru Ko Kidu Chiva
Rongkup Mutanchi Rong Monpa Kirate Maris Mayal Rongring
Ring Kirati
Limboo Limbu Li Abu Bow Yakthumba Lum Tsong Subba Kiranti
Sibakota Tsang Limbuana Sirijunga Jhung Nambang Thagim
Libang Tamling Pandhak Sering Laotti Muringlanugo Muringla
Nugo Phurumbo Phendua Nambang Thagim Libang Damai
Kami Sarki
Pulami Ala Kepchake Guranga Darlami Pun Lungalim
Lamichani Khapangi Loharung Purbachane Rana Mangratey
Lumrey Gholey Maske Balangpak Molalay Sitong
Jimdar Khambu Manjh Walla Kura Bantawa Chamling
Thulung Kulung Paldorje Bangdel Dungmali Nechali Khaling
Chhinamkhong Rajolim Dumi Dukhun
Sharya Solukhambu Yukpa Shalakha Rinasha Lama Chayaba
Goperma Khambase
Sunuwar Sunwar Mukhiya Barathare Dasthare Jirel Sunupar Sunkoshi
Koicha Poinba Grangden
Tagmaluijin Nishung Moklan Yonjan Lopchan Thing Bomyan
Bal Pakkrin Darneih Syangbo Waiba Thokar Jhimba Dong
Titung Gyapok Domjan Bropchan Negi Golay Kalden Chising
Singon Remba Nyasum Chungma Syangden Yonjan Bomjan
Domjan Lopchan Sangdan Moktan Dong Bal Titung
(continued..)
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Arunachal Pradesh
46
20
5
9
3
Chakma 39
7
Hill Miri 1
11
Miri 8
39
6
14
3
1
Adi Bokar Taluk Tapo Tapir Tapin Yajo Bune Borak Mardo Singlong
Tame Taping Ungring Sammame Samine Chije Puing Puder
Yuring Yourpin Hemi Pudur Pyasang Pujen Pulom Yourchi
Tempin Pudu Popak Lupo Yourgo Yourko Youring Gindo-
Dupa Mardo Umlong Komlon Maine Lupo Yourgo Yourko
Youring Gindo-Dupa Mardo Umlong Komlom Maine
Adi Gallong Topo Galo Tator Tani Karga Bogum Lodu Kar Taipodia
Paktu Karka Ete Loi Loya Lolen Bagra Ang Ado Doke Doje
Adi Minyoung Teli Taki Jamo Siran Moyong
Adi Pasi Dai Rukbo Mengu Yomso Apum Teknyo Yompang Yomain
Mekir
Apatani Tani Mith Mora
Tsakma Tsak Thek Tsakma Sakma Changma Changmyang
Tsakthek Chamma Jumia Jummua Dainonak Changchhan
Tuichek Chek Takamb Chawngte Dameyi Huttia Barseke
Hammey Dachya Bangsa Malima Rangi Baurua Boga Thanya
Kukua Angnu Fema Fedengsuri Fagola Hamuja Lachra
Homreng Naduktu Karma Fajera
Deori Boderiyo Patriyochau Dupiyao Khottia Hizaru Lapharu
Gucharu
Mantai
Khampti Namsoom Nangmao Manwai Mannoi Manpang Manpoong
Manchi Manchai Manoi Chowhati Manjakhoon
Oyan Saeng Maying Pator Dambuk Mirang Tamar Nuthunjee
Monpa But Matchopa Bootpa Butpa Shingjee Rahungjee Khoitumjee
Khonujee Sunukjee Rinchiadu Yammujee Khoitamjee
Runfunjee Ropu Chandok Dunglok Chug Chugpa Gumupa
Khumupa Khumuthongkor Ngarmupa Changmuchipa Dirang
Tsangla Faichurpa Gunpapa Baqipam Shorthefa Kalaktang
Lish Lishpa Kishpi Thankhar Khumu Jamkhar Khumu
Khumusangla Borzu Nyarmu Tawang Brahmi Monpa
Mishmi Idu Pulu Mendo Mega Lingi Michichi Harku
Nishi Nishang Dol Dodum Dopum Durum-Dui Dukum-Duri Tasu
Likha Chuhu Takyang Yowa Tade Tajing Byabang
Nocte Lowang Channa Mikhiak
Singpho Jingpho
(continued..)
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181
Nagaland
Angami 23
Ao 10
Chang 12
2
Tangsa Ketna Havi Hawai Mandok Takhe Bontai Nokka Pangtha
Solting Songthing Kelum Wangpap Ngaimong Ketchi Mantai
Jugli Yougli Taiman Taikhaw Taikin Kolral Kolhriyen Korang
Korah Jank Jok Taibi Menti Khonga Khangnyal Kimsing
Chamchang Sina Sehang Langtin Latom Maipole Mepok
Chhojam Sejam Chaso Changso Cholam Cholum Lungchang
Kenglang Khomrang Namai Lulin Tailong Lungphi Yongkhung
Tairing Khoipang Morang Mungray
Nyamran Tapsang Haile Hailang Palket Kethong Sano Mosang
Rangkhaw Lomko Chithang Wakpat Kethung Rangwang
Jongkhung Ranka Thampong Teekhaon Muklom Mokolm
Monglum Tangha Cohangmi Khimhun Techi Shungkho
Rekhung Wangra Tekhil Yangchang Matcha Sayung Ngemu
Nalang Kitnal Ronrang Poerah Longti Woety  Chumbyu
Lishey Chummut Gahja Nokwi Jangloo Shesu Matwa Pechong
Kewa Kubu Shama Rigang Nori Ngalo Langhe
Joeboi Rewey Diwa Tamkote Morang Kuchit Lomme Nagu
Kisha Shosa Wellyo Sangwal Charwan Sangkhu Taipon Taiwai
Sangrang Taiboi Telung Sanke Sechu Chasha Keykap
Kongrang Kianoo Taorah Nangkong Khokhong Lowey Allon
Chuwrah Wanpi Sintak Shongrey Tikhak Tailong Hanglung
Taching Tairing Longjing Mokhom Wankhang Momai
Jangshong Taimak Taidang Taihu Kamba Taichu Taitha
Mungkhom Mowan Tonglim Tyolim Tonglum
Chokhang Chunga Dewe Jankhe Khangla Khanyak Khapwing
Koje Kunsing Wyonsongm Yongkuk Ngokhom Tailong Taihu
Taichu Kamba Taitha
Tengima Gnamei Tsungumi Tsungung Mour Chakroma
Tengima Chakrama Kezami Putir Dzunokehena Zounuo
Keyhonuo Khonoma Tengima Kezami Khezha Memi Pezina
Pepfuma Tepa Thevo Kemovo
Aor Chunglir Chongli Mongsen Changki Dikhu Melak Tsurong
Pongen Lomou
Chongnu Changsang Mazung Duenching Changru Changhlai
Kangshau Ong Hongang Ongbou Lakpu Youkoubu
Khiamngan Kelukenyu Yingshanku
(continued..)
58
35
Lotha 3
Phom 2
26
Rengma 3
Sangtam 2
Sema 8
13
Zeliang 24
12
34
Manipur
Hmar 8
7
7
Loi 8
Mao 7
8
Konyak/Wancho Haha Taprongumi Minyumo Nagami Mirirr Chagk Nahngra
Lwang Kongnok Angnophang Wanghu Paiknok Matpisun
Yanlam Laktu Hu Hentokhu Punlonghu Angwanhu Shishohu
Manching Wangnanting Wonghu Wangnayaum
Wangchingphong Lwang Angnophang Ang Konyak Tangjan
Tsangjan Wangham Wangpan Wangsa Wangsu Bailung
Kyon Chuwami Eryung
Kahha Nyuthery
Pochury Sapo Kechuri Khury Sozomi Kheza Nyushury Shantary Shomli
Tsori Nyusoury Nyuwiry Ngory Phochiry Pojar Katiry Trakha
Jurry Fithu Thurr Thupitou Leyri Tsang Nyuwiri Nyutheri
Nqouri Nyuwini
Ntenye Nzong Raimye
Tukomi Sangtamrr
Semi Sumi Yathi Igha Kukami Awo-U Asashokipini Khiphur
Yimchunger Yanchunger Yachumi Yimchuger Tikhir Makware Chirr
Jankhurnger Janger Khiumger N'daine Kusun Khiunger
Limkhiungkhugar
Zemei Zemi Liangmei Zeliangrong Rongmei Mpame Newme
Nriame Sogome Kenye Hararme Gangmei Pamei Malangmei
Riamei Dhangmei N'rongmei Newmei Tinkupen Kedeipeo
Kamei Gonmei Gangmei Mu
Chakhesang Chakhru Kheza Chazho Thevo Khamutso Epao Putso Kheza
Khutso Lawa Mero Khezha
Kuki Chin Khongshai Khonjai Khosamai Kotsoma Kuki-Chin Lushai
Lakher Lua Kumki Choughthu Lnykim Lengthang Singsit
Thado Vaiphei Gangte Changsan Kholhou Thangugen
Lhangsum Aengna Hauneng Daugel Bangsing Chougloi Haolai
Sitlhou Thado Haokip Kipgen Singsin Haosa Thempu
Sinlung Inpui Inpuisuok Tutluk Tutluksouk Chimsen
Chimsensuok Sal
Kabui Rongmei Haumei Kammei Ganmei Langmei Gangmei
Khandangmei
Kom Karong Saicho Leivon Tolon Serto Lupheng Mangte
Chakpa Ningthouja Angom Khumal Moirang Luwang Sarang-
Leishangthem Khaba-Nganba
Imemi Memei Lepaona Saranami Paomata Kapematta
Tolepamatta
Maring Chimkur Dangsa Charanga Kansouwa Mekunga Khulpuwa
Lamthakka Hleyowa
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Meitei 8
13
8
10
Vaiphei 14
Mizoram
Mizo/Biate 20
Thadou 14
Tripura
5
13
Mog 14
4
Munda 9
2
12
7
1
7
Tripuri 18
3
Meghalaya
Khasi 13
Jaintia 10
Manipuri Ningthouja Angom Chengloi Ngongba Looang
Khoomon Moirang
Paite/Zou Paihte Tedim Chin Gwite Sukte Nwite Kamhau Nwingalte
Akambau Manlun Samte Simte Zoukam Manlun
Pangal Shiekh Sayyed Pathan Shah Khan Choudhury Mia Khaaoraora
Tangkhul Noga Naokhokha Raphei Kashung Reekhang Rem Kamo
Kharao Khaorui Chontung
Suantak Vanglua Neilut Thanglet Puakpawl Hansing Saivung
Chonlu Khaute Phaltual Chonmang Ellu Keusel Neisial
Baite Biete Duhlian Ngamlai Nampui Chungngawl Zate Tamte
Thlihran Royang Thianglai Hmunhring Khurbi Puilo Faihriam
Darnei Kampui Ngamlai Ngirsim Thiate
Chongthu Duhlian Sitthloh Khuangsai Milui Singsuan
Lianthang Haukip Kipgen Thongpam Dongel Chawngthu Lal
Upa
Haluadas Sonahatia Chhabhaiya Astisuddha Kashyap Rachi
Jugi Jogi Nath Tanti Shiv Ekadashi Masya Halwa Ranrej Kambule
Manihari Palangsa Barendra Baidik Nath
Magh Mag Maga Mugg Mogh Marma Kokpyasa Khangsa
Cheringsa Marusa Wodgensa Wookkinsa Chakpregia Rakhocha
Mahisyadas Matsyadas Haluadas Halladas Alambayana
Mura Kerketta Kanduru Gondli Hansa Jirhul Bhengra
Mundori Porti
Namasudra Kashyap Gaigra
Noatia Naitang Gabing Khaklu Anak Fatuij Mougbai Taugbai Keora
Khalni Harbeng Daindak Kerang
Nunia Chouchan Semara Kharhadia Haudihoya Nunchuhua
Matkatowa Belderowa
Patni Alimman
Riang Meska Raicha Charkhi Mochha Chompreng Waireng Apaia
Tripra Tipera Deb Barman Bachal Siuk Kuatia Daitya-Singh
Hujuria Siltia Chatratuia Chatradharia Deunai Subenarayan
Sena Julai Beri Dona Daspa
Kapali Kashyap Harihar Alimman
Amwi Lyngam Bhoi War Khynriam Khynrium Syiem Lyngdoh
Walang Rayand Songkali Lapang Dorphang
Pnar Synteng Syntang Amwi Changpung Jowai Nartia Raliana
Sutnga Matabeng
(continued..)
60
Garo 20
12
Hajong 16
Assam
12
15
8
7
Kachari 3
Bodo 3
5
12
Karbi
11
-
7
5
1
5
Meitei
10
Munda 1
-
1
8
12
Santhal
11
14
Mande Achik Akawe Awe Chisak Dual Machi Ambeng Abeng
Chibok Ruga Ganching Gara Atong Megam Sangma Marak
Momin Areng Shira
Rabha Rongdani Naitori Pati Dahuri Pati Dahori Rongdani Maitori
Total Kocha Rato
Khatal Parachungwa Chondi Parakati Baliati Kendegaon
Dingar Akshigaon Tokleygaon Sinulgaon Difragaon Kashigaon
Phulgaon Ghorabali Koitar Sonamukhi
Ahom Raja Burgohain Borgohain Duwara Dihingiya Lahon Sandikai
Deodhai Mohan Panch Chiring Tai
Bishnupriya Leimanai Ningthuanai Khoomala Moirang Angam Luwang
Mangang Ningthoja Khabananba Mudgalya Angiras Atreya
Bharadwaja Kausika Sandilya Gautam
Chutiya Birinchi Borahi Deori Levite Bora Hazarika Chetia Barua
Hira Byash Sanatan Sutor Raghunath Bhewali Medhi Sarandas
Barman Khunang Dilek
Swarga-Aroi Basumatary Musa-Aroi
Kaibarta Nadial Jalia Bamunia Haridhwania Sutradhar
Kalita Kulta Kulata Kulalipta Kakati Das Bharali Patahk Medhi
Bhuyan Timung Saikia Deka
Arleng Mikir Dumrali Chintong Ronghang Amri Ingty Inghy
Teron Terang Menkiri
Keot
Kharia Dudh Dhelki Pahari Suren Barla Dhanwar Kerketa
Kurmi Bedia Kurmi Surya Nath Bahohier Tirower
Lalung Tiwa
Matak Moran Moamaria Senapati Mayamara Khoomon
Manipuri Meithei Moirang Koomul Ningthouja Angom
Chengloi Ngongba Looang Moirang
Haroko
Namasudra
Oraon Kurukh
Rajbanshi Koch Pathak Dihidar Phousdar Singha Pradhani Adhikari
Maghahia
Ravidas Chamar Muchi Piplang Kachchhap Kush Nona Kanaujia
Dushia Jeshwara Bedis Tota Bhojpuria
Kisku Tudu Hembrom Hasdak Besra Baskey Soren Marndi
Core Phatowal Pauris
Sonowal Kachari Bali Khitiari Chiripuria Amarabamiya Dhulial Ujani Kuchia
Namoni Kuchia Tipamia Betari Gezepi Memi Makrari
Neskatari Hagumiri Nakrari
Notes: Total number of clans and sub-clans for 92 aboriginal ethnic groups is 1,269 as mentioned in the
People of India chapters.
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Table 1.13: Georeferencing of ethnic groups
Ethnic groups Latitude Longitude
Sikkim
27.2925 88.2457
Tamang 27.2349 88.5788
Bhutia 27.7167 88.5539
27.2312 88.4671
Chetri 27.3720 88.2122
Gurung 27.2678 88.0776
Lepcha 27.5098 88.4288
27.1349 88.1506
Mangar 27.1791 88.3305
Rai 27.3073 88.1323
Sherpa 27.1426 88.0682
Arunachal Pradesh
28.1213 95.8374
27.5466 93.8006
Chakma 27.4866 96.2018
27.6635 95.8412
Hill Miri 27.6783 93.5131
26.9902 95.4646
Miri 28.0365 95.3141
27.5861 91.8507
Excerpts from People of India indicative of geo-
location of ethnic groups
Sunuwar West district; Hilly terrain; High Altitude;
High Humidity; Forest; Heavy Rainfall
Lower Teesta valley, Rangit valley
North Sikkim;Hilly terrain; High Altitude;
Lachung-Pa; Lachen-Pa
Bhujel South sikkim, Hilly Terrain, Mean altitude
1500meters; Tokal village
West, South, East districts; Hill slopes; 900
meters-1900 meters; Teesta and Rangit rivers
South, West districts; Hilly terrain; High
Altitude; Forest; Heavy Rainfall
North district; Extreme cold climate; lower
altitude in contrast to Bhutias, Not snow-
bound places; Dzongu area
Limboo Western district;Sparsely forested slopes, 1200
meters to 1900 meters
South district;1200 meters to 1900 meters;
Teesta and Rangit River; Good monsoon
rainfall.
East,West, South district; 900 meters-1900
meters; Few in the North district.
West district, Okhray, Tikpur, Rumbuk, Ridpi,
Bhareng, Sapray-nagi, Burikhop, Soreng,
Singling, Dentam
Adi Pasi Balek, Rasam, Kalek, Pasighat
Apatani Apatani valley, Ziro, Hapoli. Lower Subansiri
district
Baijan circle in Lower subansiri district, miao
sub-division of changlang district, chowkam
circle of lohit district
Deori Lekang circle in mahadevpur area, dayun circle
in lohit district
Ziro and Daporizo Sub-Division of Lower and
Upper Subansiri District, majority in lower
subansiri
Khampti Tirap District, South of Lohit river
East Siang, majority lives in Assam
Monpa West Kameng District, Tawang District
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28.9158 95.6054
27.8026 94.2860
26.9025 95.5086
27.1357 95.7258
27.5368 93.8812
27.1357 95.7258
28.1664 94.6973
28.1637 94.7695
28.0619 95.3172
Nagaland
Konyak 26.7219 95.0198
Lotha 26.0911 94.2372
Phom 26.4907 94.8049
25.6810 94.6146
Rengma 25.7161 94.0068
Sangtam 25.8694 94.7833
Sema 26.0132 94.5065
26.2366 94.7862
Zeliang 25.7612 93.8276 South-western part of Kohima district
25.6297 94.4020
25.7612 93.8276
Angami 25.6747 94.0718 Kohima district,
Ao 26.4352 94.4824
Chang 26.3137 94.8490
26.2026 95.0061
Manipur
Loi 24.7270 94.0059 Imphal district
Mao 25.4618 94.1966 Senapati district
24.4433 94.1177
Meitei 24.4970 93.7556 Manipur valley
24.0928 93.2954
24.6495 93.9702
24.8600 94.4971
Mishmi Idu DibangValley District
Nishi Upper and Lower Subansiri District, near the
streams Khru Ranga Dikrang
Nocte Khonsa, Namsang, Laju circles of Tirap
District, Borduria and Mansang VIllage
Singpho Changlang and Lohit district, area drained by
rivers Burhi-Dihing, Noa-Dihing, Tengapani
Tagin Upper Subansiri district
Tangsa Changlang district, Manmao and Nampong
circles
Adi Bokar West Siang district, Gesing, Pangri
Adi Gallong West Siang district, Along, Basar, rugged
mountains
Adi Minyoung Pasighat, Kabang, Yemsing
Mon district
Wokha district
Tuensang district, Longleng subdivision
Pochury Phek district, Meluri sub-division
Kohima district, Tseminyu sub-division
Tuensang district, Kiphire subdivision
Zunheboto district
Yimchunger Tuensang district
Chakhesang Phek district, cold and hilly
Kuki Ghaspani and Dimapur blocks, village Maoua
Haathigurya, Tokthoriya, Eserenia, Mokochung
district
central hilly part of Tuensang district
Khiamngan eastern part of Tuensang district
Maring Khudei Khullen village, northern part of
Tengnoupal district
Paite Zougam area; unft for wet cultivation
Pangal Imphal, Thoubal, Bishnupur
Tangkhul East district; Meikhel village; 12 kms south
east of Kohima.
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Vaiphei 24.1454 93.5833
Hmar 24.1384 93.9488 southern district Manipur
25.1626 93.4611
24.9469 93.9779
Mizoram
Thadou 24.1135 92.9121
Mizo/Biate 24.0137 92.9156
Tripura
23.9046 91.3410
23.8142 91.4065 West Tripura
Mog 23.2826 91.5411
23.6059 91.8153
23.5341 91.4666 South Tripura District, Udaipur Sub-Division
23.5224 91.6403
23.8342 91.3576
23.8203 91.2124
23.5341 91.4666 West Tripura
Tripuri 23.9607 91.3991 West Tripura
23.8292 91.6030
Meghalaya
25.7910 90.8401
Hajong 25.3879 89.8989
Khasi 25.4223 91.4756
Jaintia 25.4494 92.0565
Garo 25.5720 90.5675
Assam
24.6798 92.5281
26.9878 94.5729
26.1611 90.5949
Kachari 25.1373 92.7567
Bodo 26.4132 91.8098
Churachandpur district
Kabui barrail ranges western part of manipur
Kom Village Sinam Kom
North-eastern part of Mizoram, Darlawn Block,
Ratu
north-eastern part of Mizoram, Aizawl district,
Darlawn community development block,
Darlawn.
Haluadas West Tripura; Plains, warm and temperate
climate; High humidity, heavy rainfall.
Jugi
South Tripura,Bilonia Sub-Division
Mahisyadas Hilly and Forest Terrain, heavy rainfall, All
over Tripura
Namasudra
Noatia South Tripura District, Amarpur Sub-Division
Nunia West Tripura, Plains; Forest;Warm climate;
High humidity; Heavy rainfall
Patni West Tripura, Plains; Forest;Warm climate;
High humidity; Heavy rainfall
Riang
Kapali all districts, warm and temoerate climate, high
humidity, heavy rainfall
Rabha northern area of east garo hills
plains of south-west of west garohillls
khasi hills
jaintia hills district
garo hills
Bishnupriya Cachar District
Chutiya Goalpara, Kamrup, Darrang, Nowgong,
Sibsagar
Hira Goalpara (Kusia Kata, Hojalpara, Bistupur),
Barpeta (Budarutup, Sundaridlia)
Cachar District
Kokrajhar, Darrang, Goalpara, Kamrup
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27.4703 94.8826 Plains, Dibrugarh
25.4300 90.1100 Between 25.43 and 26.53, 90.11
26.7429 94.1324
Karbi 25.8384 93.4078 Karbi Anglong District
26.1430 91.5628 no specifc description given
27.8463 95.2873 tea garden
26.2769 94.0630 tea garden
26.2351 92.8981
27.1823 94.7271 Brahmaputra Valley, Upper Assam
26.5431 91.9115
Munda 27.5678 95.5478
25.5678 94.5478 tea garden
26.0257 89.9584
24.5678 94.5478 tea garden
Santhal 26.3827 90.0220
Sonowal Kachari
Kalita
Kaibarta Kamrup, Darrang, Nowgong, Jorhat districts
Keot
Kharia
Kurmi
Lalung "most of them are found in jowai subdivision of
Jayantia distrct, Meghalaya", Nagaon district
most, also Lakhimpur, Sibsagar
Ahom
Matak Dibrugarh, Sibsagar, Lakhimpur, Darrang
tea garden, Doomdooma area
Oraon
Rajbanshi Goalpara, Kokrajhar, Kamrup
Ravidas
tea garden, mostly Kokrajhar, Kachugaon area
Notes: Each ethnic groups are assigned to a geographic location depending on the major concentration
as indicated in the People of India chapters. Wherever districts are indicated as major concentration,
we have considered supplementary information, such as, rivers, valleys, plains, or altitude of preferred
settlement of the concerned ethnic groups to determine approximate latitude and longitude for each ethnic
groups. In cases where no information is available, we explored census data to find out districts with
major concentration after verifying from the district government websites. In the cases specific villages
are mentioned as their ancestral homes, those are the georeferenced.
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Table 1.14: Variance infation factors (VIFs)
Women's sample Men's sample
Dependent variable:
Estimation method: OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-patrilocal residence 2.76 - 2.45 -
Ease of divorce 1.80 - 2.05 -
Matrilineal descent 2.04 - 1.49 -
Social norm index - 2.13 - 2.33
Ancestral subsistence: agriculture 1.54 1.49 1.80 1.70
Ancestral subsistence: gathering 1.83 1.58 2.01 1.76
Ancestral subsistence: hunting 2.38 2.26 2.58 2.48
Ancestral subsistence: fshing 2.06 1.93 2.31 2.20
Ancestral subsistence: husbandry 2.37 2.10 2.65 2.39
Ancestral subsistence: pastoralism 2.50 2.34 2.93 2.84
Ancestral female role in agriculture 2.07 1.88 2.25 2.10
1.59 1.52 1.43 1.39
Settlement patterns 1.96 1.56 2.05 1.65
Community land ownership 1.93 1.68 2.18 1.97
Age in years 1.12 1.12 1.11 1.11
Education in years 1.35 1.34 1.36 1.36
Household size 1.65 1.65 1.61 1.61
Nuclear family dummy 1.39 1.39 1.43 1.43
Wealth index 2.02 2.01 1.98 1.98
Rural 1.34 1.34 1.36 1.36
Witnessed parental violence 1.09 1.08 1.07 1.07
Alcoholism 1.06 1.05 1.06 1.06
Altitude higher than 1000 meters 1.34 1.33 1.36 1.34
Soil suitability hunting-gathering relative to agriculture1.52 1.49 1.71 1.66
Soil suitability pastoralism relative to agriculture 1.23 1.21 1.19 1.18
mean VIF 1.75 1.61 1.81 1.73
1.07 1.06 1.07 1.06
0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Observations 6435 6435 4410 4410
Appendix Table A4:  Variance infation factors (VIFs)
Violence
ever
Violence
ever
Violence
attitude
Violence
attitude
Ancestral female role in agriculture and allied
production
VIF tolerance =1/(1-R2)
R2
Notes:  These regressions do not include fxed efects for eight Indian north-eastern
states, religions and the intercept.
Notes: These regressions are run without intercept and do not include fixed effects for eight northeastern
states of India and four religions.
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CHAPTER2
Social Norms, Subsistence Patterns
and Gender Bias: Evidence from
India’s Northeast
Abstract
I uncover a complete mechanism of gender disparity from fertility to morality
using a novel cross-sectional dataset of 22,000 mothers and their 51,000 children
from 92 aboriginal ethnic groups that combine ethnographic and environmental data
to demographic data in the northeastern zone of India. Descendants from the ethnic
groups with pro-women features tend to discriminate less against their daughters.
In ethnic groups which value women more, a typical female child is more likely to
be the last born, more likely to experience longer succeeding birth interval, more
likely to be breastfed longer, and more likely to receive overall better nourishment.
Contemporary female employment status does not drive these effects. Both the
magnitude and statistical significance of the effects remain unaltered in regressions
with contemporary female employment status. This is because the effects originate
from the deep-rooted ancestral female productive roles and pro-women social norms.
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2.1 Introduction
Amartya Sen famously declared an estimated over 100 million women are missing (Sen,
1987, 1990, 1992) in China and India because of discrimination against girls and conse-
quent excess mortality. The predicament of “missing women” culminates into short-run
effects on marriage and labor market (Angrist, 2002). The long-run unfavorable effects are
sustained through the persistence of gender bias (Grosjean and Khattar, 2019). It reveals
the gender bias through fertility and sex preference (Clark, 2000; Das Gupta et al., 2003),
sex-biased stopping rules (Jayachandran, 2015; Bhalotra and Van Soest, 2008; Das Gupta,
2005; Jensen, 2003; Arnold, Choe, and Roy, 1998), daughter neglect (Pande et al., 2006) in
breastfeeding duration (Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011), immunization (Oster, 2009)
and nutrition (Mishra, Roy, and Retherford, 2004). Not surprisingly, gender equality is a
policy priority in both the Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development
Goals. The limited success (World Bank, 2015) is explained either by economic under-
development that exacerbates gender discrimination (Jayachandran, 2015; Qian, 2008;
Burgess and Zhuang, 2000) or by the persistence of social norms (Das Gupta et al., 2003;
Kishor, 1993) that constricts the opportunities for women and allows the gender bias to
persist in society. In this paper, I argue that the latter is the driver of the gender bias be-
cause of inefficiencies in the persistent kinship institutions (Chakraborty and Kim, 2010,
2008; Dyson and Moore, 1983), and marriage customs (Pande and Astone, 2007).
Ethnic groups which exalt sons operate on patriarchal social norms and kinship insti-
tutions (Dyson and Moore, 1983; Chakraborty and Kim, 2010). In patrilineal kinship, the
descent is traced through the male line and therefore, sons are important for the continu-
ity of lineage (Jayachandran, 2015). In patrilocal marriage, after marriage, the bride lives
with the groom’s kin. Since daughters cannot provide old-age supports to their parents,
they are less valued (Chung and Gupta, 2007). Several other complementary patriarchal
norms, including dowry, which increases the cost of a daughter (Anderson, 2003), patri-
lineal inheritance (Botticini and Siow, 2003), and customary divorce norms (Chakraborty
and Kim, 2008) diminish women’s value in the society. A less regarded female child is
unlikely to be the last birth to her parents since son preference triggers a “try again for a
boy” fertility preference (Jayachandran, 2017a) sooner after her birth. More recent liter-
ature recognize certain less obvious potential factors that can help trace the origins and
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persistence of such patriarchal social norms, kinship, subsistence economy (Alesina, Giu-
liano, and Nunn, 2018), and their manifestation in gender biased parental investments in
their children (Barcellos, Carvalho, and Lleras-Muney, 2014). Environmental conditions
and gender roles in a subsistence economy can also determine the social and economic
relative value of children by sexes (Carranza, 2011; Bardhan, 1974). The natural question
emerges: what is the combined effect of women’s ancestral productive roles and ancestral
pro-women social norms on the gender biased parental investment in their children.
I estimate a complete mechanism on gender discrimination — from fertility to lac-
tation, immunization, dietary care, and mortality. My empirical strategy rests on two
pillars. First, I condition on environment by comparing only within a primary sampling
unit (PSU), which is a census village or enumeration block in an urban setting. This
allows me to factor out the environmental effect on child outcomes. Omitted variable bias
can confound the estimated effects of social norms on gender bias unless environmental
conditions are fully observed. On average, in my context, the geographic area of a census
village1 is about 6.5 square kilometers. I condition on environmental conditions at the
PSU level, which allows me to factor out the environmental effects on child outcomes.
Nonetheless, a possible threat to this approach is that even within a small geographic
area of a PSU, there might exist niches and specialization. For instance, an ethnic group
following their ancestral specialization subsist on fishing irrespective of their current ge-
ographic location. I test whether principal subsistence is similar across all ethnic groups
within a PSU. Analysis in my sample shows that the principal occupation of household
head vary significantly across ethnic groups within a PSU as well as by ancestral subsis-
tence patterns and social norms. Keeping the environmental conditions and mother-level
factors constant, it is possible to get closer to causal effects of social norms on child-level
outcomes.
The second pillar rests on the postulate that social norms are sticky and persis-
tent. I compare the social norms of the People of India (1985-1992) and Murdock’s atlas
1According to the census of India 2001, the average geographic area per village in Sikkim, Arunachal
Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya, and Assam are 16 square kilometers, 23
square kilometers, 14 square kilometers, 11 square kilometers, 27 square kilometers, 12 square kilometers,
4 square kilometers, and 3 square kilometers, respectively. With the entire northeastern states covering
262,179 square kilometers (part of which are not inhabitable) for 40,299 census villages, there is indication
that the average land area per village is 6.5 square kilometers. Economists typically rely on geographic
units that have a grid resolution of 5 arc-minutes or 81 square kilometers at the equator. Analogously,
set at the PSU level, my geographic units are more fine-grained.
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(pre-1900) data for 16 ethnic groups covered in both the atlases (Appendix Table 2.19).
The broad congruence between the more recent ethnography with the pre-industrial and
pre-colonial ethnography suggests that social norms persistent, and ancestral female roles
are glacially transient (Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn, 2013; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012).
More formally, I explore whether the ancestral subsistence patterns, ancestral productive
roles of women, and ancestral social norms, as coded in People of India, can be traced
in contemporary cross-section sample of NFHS as a test for persistence or transience of
ancestral norms. I find the ancestral female role in agriculture predicts contemporaneous
female employment both in and outside agriculture sector (Appendix Table 2.20). To-
gether, I uncover evidence on the stickiness of ancestral female productive roles and social
norms.
Since both the ancestral female productive roles and social norms are persistent, the
results of my estimations can be interpreted as the effects of ancestral characteristics on
parental gender discrimination against female children. My findings on beneficial effects
of long-lasting women-favoring gender-roles and social norms are the following. First,
both differential birth spacing and birth stopping behavior of parents put a female child
at a disadvantage. This disadvantage is reversed when women are ancestrally highly
regarded for their productive roles and social norms are pro-women. Second, a typical
girl is relatively less likely to be weaned (breastfeeding stop) when they are descendants of
ethnic groups where women ancestrally take part in agriculture and follow non-residence
with groom’s kin. Third, all three pro-women social norms enhance the likelihood of
better nourishment for girls. Taken together, in societies where women historically take
part in agricultural and allied productive activities, this disadvantage diminishes because
women are more valued in those societies. Women-favoring social norms carry smaller
effects — both in its magnitude and statistical significance — in reducing the gender bias.
My research complements, connects, and contributes to three strands of literature.
The first body of literature that this paper most directly relates to examines the tra-
ditional modes of agricultural production and contemporary economic and demographic
consequences on women. In a well-cited paper, Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) argue
that ancient plough use from Murdock’s (1967) ethnographic atlas emphasizes the value
component of attitude towards current women’s labor force participation. The instru-
ment used in their analysis comes from the categorization of six crops that require plough
70
and non-plough harvesting and computed using geographical crop suitability geographi-
cal data from Global Agro-Economic Zones. In this sequel, Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn
(2018) trace the historical origin of cross-country differences in male-to-female sex ratio at
birth, which occurs since the descendants in plough-using societies value boys more than
girls. Deep tillage predicts suitability of land use for plough agriculture which is the origin
of lower demand for female labor in agriculture, the lower economic value of women, and
a greater discrimination on women leading to adverse child sex ratio and wider survival
differentials between boys and girls (Carranza, 2012, 2014). Further, greater restrictions
on women’s mobility and sexuality (e.g., female genital cutting, infibulation) are imposed
in pastoral societies where men remain absent from their settlements for extended periods
and heightened concerns about paternity uncertainty are prevalent (Becker, 2018, 2020).
Hansen, Jensen, and Skovsgaard (2015) find current female labor force participation,
and women’s social value, is determined by the time since the Neolithic agriculture was
adopted, which in turn can carry a sizable effect on sex ratio at birth and among children
(Fredriksson and Gupta, 2018). However, it is not clear whether the differences of sex
ratio at birth are driven by sex-selective abortions, differential spacing or stopping behav-
ior, or biology. My contribution to this strand of literature is that I show that ancestral
social norms and historical subsistence patterns can be linked to a complete set of gender
biased consequences, from differential spacing and stopping fertility, to discrimination at
postnatal stage (lactation, diet, and vaccination) as well as differential outcomes for child
mortality.
The second and relatively older strand in the literature that my research complements
relates to contemporary female employment opportunities and demographic outcomes for
women. Using state-level data, Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) find that areas in India
where female employment rates are higher tend to observe greater female child survival
since households allocate greater resources to girls where female earning opportunities are
better. Their analysis does not use spatial, environmental (Bardhan, 1974) or historic in-
struments, such as soil or agro-climatic suitability, as in Carranza (2012). Corroborating
their work in a difference-in-difference setting by exploiting a policy experiment (introduc-
tion of tea plantations in China), Qian (2008) suggests better market work opportunities
for women can improve the sex ratio and girls’ education. I contribute to this literature
by disentangling the intuitive essence from the cross-cultural studies by simultaneously
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considering (a) women’s gain in social worth in ethnic groups featuring women-favoring
social norms (ease of divorce, non-patrilocal post-marital residence, and matrilineal de-
scent), (b) women’s gain in economic worth when women ancestrally pursue agriculture
and additional productive activities (such as basketry, weaving, husbandry, and fishing)
and traditionally contribute to subsistence as actively as men, and (c) contemporary fe-
male labor force participation leading to greater bargaining gains — girls are as valued
as boys — which translates into improved gender outcomes.
Another strand in the literature addresses the links between social-norms and demo-
graphic, education, labor market outcomes for women. Focusing on the differences in
patriarchal norms (patrilocality and patrilineal descent and inheritance) in north India
and partial female inheritance in south India, Dyson and Moore (1983) explain the dif-
ferences in regional demographics by the differences in gender relations. However, they
left out the northeastern states which have the greatest diversity in terms of kinship
institutions. They analyze only sample means and takes no deference to different agri-
cultural systems or agro-climatic factors. Kishor (1993) simultaneously considers female
labor force participation and kinship institutions to explain gender differentials in child
mortality using district-level data. The effects of ancestral subsistence patterns, ancestral
female participation in subsistence, ancestral social norms, and contemporary female em-
ployment on violence against women is documented in Alesina, Brioschi, and La Ferrara
(2016), which presents differences in means by the different predictors but lacks simulta-
neous regression of subsistence patterns and social norms. Prior to inheritance reforms in
Ghana in 1985, parents endowed their sons with additional human capital to substitute
for the lack of assets they would face by not inheriting. This incentive is mitigated among
Ghanaian matrilineal groups by the reforms, where the cap on female inheritance leads
to less schooling of boys (La Ferrara, 2007). Matriliny predicts higher child survival in
Lowes and Montero’s (2017) spatial regression discontinuity along the matrilineal belt in
Congo. Their estimates do not differentiate by sex, do not substantially address gender
bias, and consider matriliny to be exogenous. The agro-climatic environment can explain
the origins of matrilineal inheritance, as more fishing opportunities for men predicts ma-
trilineal horticultural land inheritance for women (BenYishay, Grosjean, and Vecci, 2017).
I complement this strand in the literature in two ways. First, a multivariate estimation
using ancestral subsistence patterns, ancestral gender-roles in subsistence, and ancestral
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social norms strengthens the causal interpretations and allows me to estimate economet-
rically more robust effects of the ancestral characteristics. Second, in one of the most
diverse places on Earth — India’s northeastern states — I combine environmental and
ethnographic data with the large-scale nationally representative cross-sectional data to
document the roots of gender bias in ancestral gender-roles in a subsistence and social
norms relevant for womens status.
I organize the rest of the paper as follows. The conceptual framework is in Section 2.2.
After describing data in Section 2.3, I proceed to the empirical specification in Section
2.4. I lay results out in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Conceptual framework and hypotheses
In the Nash bargaining models of intra-household distribution (Lundberg and Pollak,
1993), non-cooperative equilibrium within a marriage refers to an intra-household distri-
bution corresponds to the utility-maximizing strategy taken by each spouse by taking the
other spouse’s strategy as given. The relative bargaining power of spouses depends on
their ‘threat point’ (the utility of a spouse if the household cannot agree on an allocation).
A higher threat point can improve a spouse’s position within the household, resources con-
trolled by them, and allocation in their favor. Within this theoretical framework, I focus
on ancestral characteristics of women which shift their ‘threat points’ and formulate four
inter-related hypotheses.
First, in the past societies where women took part in agriculture and productive ac-
tivities, their economic value is perceived high (Alesina, Brioschi, and La Ferrara, 2016).
The extent to which women are economically more valuable, due to persistence of values
regarding gender roles in the long run, should allow girls to experience reduced discrim-
ination. Such perceptions that viewed women as economically productive and equal to
men led to evolution of women-favoring social norms.
The next hypothesis relates to the social norms regarding living arrangements of cou-
ples after marriage. The gender bias2 in parental investments are accentuated in societies
2Arnold (1997) complies a few such expressions, such as, “[b]ringing up a daughter is like watering
your neighbor’s garden”, “[m]ay you be the mother of hundred sons”, “[a] son is your own, a daughter is
someone else’s”, “even the beams of the house shed tears when a girl is born”, “[a] woman should obey
her father before marriage, her husband during married life, and her son in widow-hood”, “[a] new-born
son should be laid on bed, clad in fine clothes, and given precious stones to play with, while a girl at
birth should be left on the floor, with only a diaper on and given only pieces of roof-tile to play with.”
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where men are at the focus of social order (Basu and Basu, 1991; Dyson and Moore, 1983).
Societies where patrilocal post-marital residence patterns prevail, investment in daughters
(Levine and Kevane, 2003) are likely to benefit the family-in-law since after marriage she
moves to her husband’s place (Rossi and Rouanet, 2015). On the other hand, sons func-
tion as widow-hood insurance for their mothers (Lambert and Rossi, 2016) and old-age
supports (Becker, Murphy, and Spenkuch, 2016). The status elevation for mothers in the
society and family also occurs once they give birth to sons (Das Gupta et al., 2003) in
patrilocal ethnic groups. In patrilocal societies, Bau (2019) finds more human capital
investments are directed towards sons relative to daughters. In non-patrilocal societies
the opposite would occur.
Another motive for gender biased parental investment in children comes from the de-
scent norms (Rammohan and Robertson, 2012). Anthropologists (Fox, 1934) believe that
several kinship institutions place restrictions on the choicest sex of the child. In particular,
Chakraborty and Kim (2010) describe the predicted relations between female bargaining
power and several kinship institutions. Similar to living arrangement norms, the descent
(patrilineal and matrilineal) kinship institutions affect women’s bargaining power within
marriage (Holden, Sear, and Mace, 2003). Both the lineage and inheritance of real assets
(La Ferrara, 2007) are passed on through female line in matrilineal family systems. In
contrast to patrilineal societies, daughter preference (Narzary and Sharma, 2013) should
emerge. Therefore, the gender biased parental investment (i.e., disproportionate invest-
ment in boys as opposed to girls) should be less in matrilineal ethnic groups than in their
patriarchal counterparts.
Women fare better in mutual consent divorce regimes (Fernández and Wong, 2017).
Bargaining models predict that easier divorce norms should increase wife’s bargaining
position (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2006), and her preferences should be reflected in intra-
household distribution of resources (Gray, 1998). If mothers have more pro-daughter
preferences than fathers, then ease of divorce norms should help eliminate gender dis-
crimination against girls.
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2.3 Data
I assemble several data sources. To get at a sample of over 51,000 children, I pool two
waves of the National Family and Health Survey (NFHS) conducted in 1998 and 2005.
These are nationally representative cross-sectional data sets, which survey women across
India between the ages of 15 and 49 years whose children are younger than 5 years old.
The surveys follow the internationally standardized questionnaires and sampling design
of the Monitoring and Evaluation to Assess and Use Results Demographic and Health
Surveys (MEASURE DHS). The advantage of this data set is that it provides a large
sample of children from the complete birth history of a survey respondent — the mother
— along with a variety of information on fertility preferences, contraception, child health,
and demographic and household characteristics. Each observation in NFHS includes the
respondent’s self-reported ethnicity. I combine both ethnographic and environmental data
with the cross-section observation in the NFHS, using the following six broad steps. First,
I clean the text data and correct them for spelling variations and spelling errors to arrive
at a homogeneously spelled ethnic group name mentioned in the People of India for 92
aboriginal ethnic groups. Second, I aggregate the 1,269 clan and sub-clan names for the 92
ethnic groups. I repeat the previous step for spelling corrections (Appendix Table 2.17).
Here, the matching involves the match with clan/sub-clan and then the match with ethnic
group. In NFHS-2, the stated ethnic names are available for the household heads only,
which are assigned to the children. Overall, I could match 80 percent of women from
NFHS-3 and 59 percent of household heads to their corresponding ethnic groups (Table
2.1).
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Table 2.1: Matching of ethnic groups in NFHS to ethnic groups in People of India
Matching method Women's sample in NFHS-3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct match by 92 ethnic groups 7438 36.75% 76 82.61%
Matched by 1269 clan or sub-clan names 8530 42.15% 81 88.04%
Matched by spelling variations in 92 ethnic groups 15520 76.69% 88 95.65%
Matched by spelling variations in 1269 clan/sub-clan 16089 79.50% 92 100.00%
Not matched/ Misspecifed 4149 20.50% ... ...
Household sample in NFHS-2
Direct match by 92  ethnic groups 3947 31.42% 65 70.65%
Matched by 1269 clan or sub-clan names 4290 34.15% 69 75.00%
Matched by spelling variations in 92 ethnic groups 6961 55.40% 85 92.39%
Matched by spelling variations in 1269 clan/sub-clan 7394 58.85% 89 96.74%
Not matched/ Misspecifed 4013 31.94% ... ...
Cum.
obs.
Percent
 Obs.
Cum.
ethnicity
Cumulative
% ethnicity
Notes: NFHS-3 reports ethnic groups by households, women and men questionnaire responses. NFHS-2
surveyed only households and women, while the ethnic groups are available only for households. The
potential number of women aged 15 to 49 with stated ethnic groups in NFHS-3 is 20,238. For NFHS-2,
we have 11,407 households for eight northeastern states of India. I code social norms and subsistence
patterns (see Table 2.1) for a set of 92 ethnic groups who are aboriginal to the northeastern states from
the state volumes of People of India. In addition, we complied a comprehensive list of 1,269 clan or
sub-clan names for these 92 ethnic groups (see Table 2.3).
Third, I code a set of thirty social norms and ancestral lifeways (Table 2.16) for all 92
aboriginal ethnic groups. Fourth, I merge the coded ethnography to the NFHS observation
using the ethnic identity of each observation. Fifth, I georeference all 92 ethnic groups
to their approximate ancestral homelands (Table 2.18). Sixth, within the bounding box
for northeastern zone of India (Latitude: 22.89 — 28.91 and Longitude: 88.03 — 96.20),
I merge the soil and climate data from Beck and Sieber (2010), which contains predicted
suitability for four major subsistence patterns (Table 2.2). Following Becker (2020), I
construct three linearly independent indicator variables for whether the environment is
most suited for (a) hunting-gathering, (b) animal husbandry, and (c) pastoralism, relative
to agriculture since in our sample most of the ethnic groups are agrarian societies. I
elaborate the detailed steps for data construction methods in the Appendix (2.A and
2.B).
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Table 2.2: Suitability of soil and climate for agriculture,animal husbandry, pastoralism
and hunting-and-gathering by children and georeferenced ethnic groups
By children By ethnic groups
Mean Std. Dev Obs. Mean Std. Dev Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Soil and climate most suited for agriculture 0.33 0.47 51,400 0.46 0.50 92
Soil and climate most suited for husbandry 0.00 0.00 51,400 0.00 0.00 92
0.66 0.48 51,400 0.53 0.50 92
Soil and climate most suited for pastoralism 0.01 0.11 51,400 0.01 0.10 92
Soil and climate most suited for hunting-
gathering
Notes: The spatial prediction data on suitability of land at 20 kilometer, 50 kilometer, and 100 kilometer
radii of the georeference of ethnic group is obtained from Beck and Seiber (2010) which are computed
assuming only soil and climate afects soil-suitability for four basic land use types using Ecological Niche
Modeling. The most suitable land use is constructed three linearly independent indicator variables
for whether (i) the environment is most suited for hunting and gathering (48 ethnic groups), (ii) the
environment is most suited for husbandry (no ethnic group), or (iii) the environment is most suited for
pastoralism (1 ethnic group), where the reference category is “soil and climate most suited for agriculture”
(43 ethnic group).
Many of these social norms and subsistence patterns are complementary to each other
and hence inter-related. To avoid a multicollinearity problem, based on the variance
inflation factors, I select a set of 22 explanatory variables. I present summary statistics
for these explanatory variables in Table 2.3, both by children and by ethnic groups.
Among the subsistence, agriculture left out of the analysis, since it is prevalent in over
90 percent of sample children and ethnic groups and offers the least variation. Among
children, 49 percent are girls and 74 percent live in rural areas. Furthermore, among
children, 16 percent are descendants of matrilineal ethnic groups, 29 percent belong to
societies where their mothers do not have to live with the groom’s kin. In 41 ethnic
groups, mothers face more liberal options of divorce. The contemporaneous employment
of women is high with 49 percent of children’s mothers being employed. One-third of
mothers of children in my sample work in agriculture, and one-fifth are engaged outside
agriculture. Most mothers are educated up to secondary levels (32 percent) with only 4
percent having received higher education. Overall, the mother-level covariates are similar
across boys and girls. Therefore, my estimates will not be sensitive to the inclusion of
these mother level covariates, since the empirical specification primarily focusses on the
sex of the child and its interaction with gender-roles in subsistence and social norms.
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2.4 Empirical specification
I estimate the composite effects of mothers’ ancestral roles in subsistence, as well as,
the effects of ancestral subsistence patterns at their ethnicity level on gender discrimina-
tion of their children, holding the social norms and agro-climatic environment constant
in a multivariate analysis. The outcomes of interest are the child’s prenatal experience
(succeeding birth interval, and fertility stop), neonatal cares by parents (lactation, vacci-
nation, and nutrition inputs), and child mortality. For outcome variables other than the
incidence of fertility stop, vaccination, and dietary inputs, the data is right-censored. The
remaining outcome variables are succeeding birth interval, breastfeeding, and mortality,
which I right-censor. Right censoring is important because it ends the observation before
the time of occurrence of an ‘event’ (succeeding birth takes place, breastfeeding stop, or a
child’s death) since the censoring time is fixed as the survey ends. Thus, if T is a child’s
death (in months), we can only observe that T>36; in a sense, a child’s death is “singly”
right-censored at age 36 months. To keep the estimates relatively robust, I estimate haz-
ard as an unobserved characteristic of a child (not exactly the probability since hazard
has no upper bound at one, but it cannot be less than zero) of an event at a specified time
t. Using Cox (1972) semi-parametric proportional hazard model allows me to not have
to choose some particular probability distribution function to represent survival times. I
assume the hazard of a child is a fixed proportion of the hazard for any other child, as long
as they belong to the same ethnic groups and remain within the same primary sampling
unit. Intuitively, the hazard at time t corresponds to the risk event happening at time t.
Essentially, the following equation says that the hazard for child i at time t is the product
of baseline hazard hi,m,e(0) (which is left unspecified, except it is non-negative), and a
linear function of a set of independent variables, which is exponentiated:
hi,m,e(t) = hi,m,e(0)exp(β1Girl + β2GirlieFie + F
′
i,eΨ+X
′
m,eΓ + S
′
m,eΦ + i,m,e), (2.1)
where i indexes children, m mothers, and e ethnic groups. X ′ime denotes a vector of
mother-level covariates: age, education, religion, wealth quintiles. A dummy variable
indicator denotes whether the child is a female (Girlie). F ′i,e denotes a vector of indicator
variables which equals one if women in an ethnic group participate in agriculture and allied
productive subsistence economy (weaving, basketry, fishing, and hunting). S ′m,e includes
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four subsistence patterns (pastoralism, animal husbandry, fishing and hunting) of each
sample ethnic group, as well as, three social norms capturing women’s status relative to
men (ease of divorce, non-patrilocal residence, matrilineal descent) in that ethnic group.
i,m,e is the error term. I estimate Cox’s proportional hazard models when dependent
variables are censored, i.e., birth spacing, breastfeeding spell, and child mortality under
the age of three years. The estimated hazard ratios are proportional changes in hazard
rate to discrete changes in the independent variables. Hazard ratios taking the value of
less (more) than one (β1) for a female child imply relative hazard is lower (higher) than
the baseline hazard. My hypothesis: the estimated hazard ratio for the interaction with
the indicator for a female child (β2) is less than one in ethnic groups where women are
ancestrally productive, highly valued, and socially favored.
For incidence of last birth, total vaccination, and protein intake by children, I use a
linear probability model. For incidence of last birth, one needs to observe women with
completed fertility, which is not directly observable in my sample. I develop a proxy
measure of likely completed fertility by focusing on mothers who, at the time of survey,
are at their highest parity, are not currently pregnant, have no desire for more children,
and have not given birth in last five years. I specify the following linear probability model:
Yi,m,e = β1Girl + β2GirlieFie + F
′
m,eΨ+X
′
m,eΓ + S
′
m,eΦ + i,m,e, (2.2)
where Yi,m,e is an indicator variable that equals one if the woman stopped having children,
is not currently pregnant, does not have desire for more children, has not given birth in
the last 5 years, and is at her highest parity. The remaining notations are similar as in
for equation (1), above. Similarly, I apply this OLS specification for additional dependent
variables total vaccination (a dichotomous variable) and protein intake by children (an
ordered categorical variable).
2.5 Results
I can infer the son preference of parents from differential spacing behavior. This implies
that a typical girl is likely to experience a shorter successive birth of her next sibling than
a typical boy because her parents are likely to continue having children in the quest for a
son. Shorter successive birth intervals for girls are associated with adverse health outcomes
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for mothers (Anderson and Ray, 2010). It disfavor girls who are likely to compete for
fewer family resources with their younger siblings. The non-parametric estimates of the
median birth interval from the Kaplan-Meier (1958) product-limit survival function is 33
months for girls and 34 months for boys. This gender gap in birth spacing is statistically
significant at the 1% level3.
Next, I use regression analysis to test the hypothesis that ancestral gender-roles in
terms of women’s productive participation in economic activities can enhance persistent
cultural values of women and can reduce the disfavor against a female child. I estimate a
proportional hazard model, which accounts for the censoring of completed birth intervals
since the incidence of succeeding birth is unobserved as the cross-sectional survey ended,
and imposes no distributional assumptions on the baseline hazard function. Table 2.4
presents the proportional effects on the hazard rate of succeeding birth as hazard ratios.
Controlling for ancestral subsistence patterns, the mother-level covariates, and ancestral
female participation in productive activities in all the four columns, I estimate the effects
of combinations of women-favoring social norms (two at a time), in order to test the
relevance of these social norms in reducing the gender bias against girls. The top row
shows that the effect size of the child being female remains stable after adding a standard
set of women-favoring social norms. The corresponding hazard ratio of greater than 1,
which is statistically significant at the 1% level, suggests that girls have a greater risk
of experiencing the birth of a younger sibling relative to boys. In societies featuring
women’s participation in agriculture and allied productive activities (such as weaving,
basketry, fishing and animal husbandry), women’s roles are more highly regarded, and a
girl is at least as valued as a boy. The estimated hazard ratio for the women’s ancestral
productive roles interacted with the indicator for a female child is lesser than unity and
statistically significant at the 1% level, which decreases the duration between successive
birth and the hazard of having a subsequent sibling for a girl relative to the baseline
hazard.
3The estimated Chi-square test statistic of the log-rank test for equality of survivor functions between
sexes is rejected at the 1% level of significance.
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Relative to the beneficial effects of women-favoring social norms, the ‘value’ effects of
women’s ancestral productivity are stronger, both in its size and statistical significance.
Both sizable hazard ratios might endow contemporary women with reduced biases against
them if the pre-colonial cultural values regarding the economically productive gender roles
and kinship norms favoring women persist4.
To establish that the gender roles in subsistence patterns and other women-favoring
customs persist, I first compare the tabulated patterns and norms in People of India
— which were collected in the early 1990s — with Murdock’s atlas (which claim to be
ancestral) for a subset of ethnic groups that show up in both the atlases. A greater degree
of congruence (overall 85% of congruence in 13 social customs for 16 ethnic groups, in my
sample) inspires the confidence about the continuation of norms (Table 2.19). I further
explore the possibility of whether the gender roles regarding contemporaneous economic
activities of women can be predicted by traditional gender roles in subsistence patterns
and women-favoring customs. I find the persistent effects of ancestral gender roles in
subsistence and women-favoring customs on the contemporary occupation of women can
be traced in the NFHS sample. For example, ancestral female roles in agriculture predict
women’s work in agriculture and outside agriculture today (Table 2.20). Women-favoring
customs, such as non-patrilocal post-marital residence and ease of divorce, are predictors
of current women’s working status. Overall, I find some evidence that ancestral gender
roles affect contemporaneous female labor force participation. In the instances where these
ancestral predictors cannot be traced in the contemporaneous occupation of women, the
estimated effects are to be interpreted as pure effects of habituated attitudes and their
carry-forward effects on present-day gender bias.
The ideal data for examining the fertility stopping behavior would be to use women’s
data who had completed fertility and would have data for the entire birth history for all of
their children. I restrict observations to women who likely completed fertility by placing 4
restrictions on the sample: (a) women who are at their highest parity, (b) women who are
not currently pregnant, (c) women who have not expressed their desire for more children,
and (d) women who have not given birth in the last 5 years. These restrictions attempt
to ensure that my estimates are not confounding the effect of family size preference. In
search of an alternative fertility behavior that can potentially accentuate the gender bias,
4With the proof of stickiness of ancestral norms, these estimates should be closer to causal effects of
these ancestral norms.
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I estimate equation (2.2) to assess the differential stopping behavior that disfavors girls,
predicting that parents of a typical girl ‘will try another’, and it is less likely that a girl
will be the last-born child (Jensen, 2003; Barcellos, Carvalho, and Lleras-Muney, 2014).
Intuitively, if the child is a boy, then parents stop childbearing. When a girl is born,
parents continue to have children. As a result, a girl disadvantageously competes for
fewer family resources with her later-born brothers (Jayachandran and Pande, 2017).
Consistent with the findings in Table 2.4, which suggests a girl will have her younger
siblings in quicker succession than a boy, I find it is less likely that a girl would be the
last-born child. I re-estimate the identical specification in Table 2.5 and find that a girl’s
parents are less likely to stop having children in the pursuit of a son. In all four columns,
coefficients for the female child variable are estimated with greater precision. Parents of
a girl are 3 percent less likely to stop having children (in other words, more likely to have
children) than if the child is a boy. On the social norms channel, out of three women-
favoring norms, only ease of divorce speaks to the general gender bias on the girls. In
the societies where women experience greater liberty in divorcing (relative to the societies
where there are impediments in divorce customs), are likely to gain in intra-household
bargaining. This finding is consistent with theoretical predictions of distribution within
the family, especially the divorce threat models of Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy
and Horney (1981). Later, Lundberg and Pollak (1994) treat the distribution within the
family as a Nash bargaining solution to a cooperative game. However, the women-favoring
and more easier divorce customs via greater bargaining power to mothers would matter
for the improved well-being of girls only if mothers have more daughter preference (and
less son preference or at least indifference) than fathers. Reminiscent of Rosenzweig and
Schultz (1984), for any given family size preference, mothers exhibit less strong stated son
preference (Jayachandran, 2015) than the fathers, and mothers express greater daughter
preference than fathers (see Figure 2.2). The statistical significance for the effects of
women-favoring norms are weaker when these norms are bundled in the additive index of
social norms (Column 4 in Table 2.5).
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Figure 2.1: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for breastfeeding, by sex
Notes: I plot the proportion of children, by sex, who are still being breastfed at the
duration (age) on the horizontal axis.
To visualize the gender gap in breastfeeding duration, I plot the survival estimates for
sons and daughters in Figure 2.1. During the first year, the gender bias is not pronounced
(with daughters receiving slightly longer nursing). Beyond the age of 24-60 months, the
gender bias becomes accentuated. The non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimator of median
duration of completed breastfeeding does not capture this gender gap and the statistical
significance is at the 10% level. In the top row of Table 2.6 displays the hazard ratio is
larger than one and statistically significant at the 1% level. It implies significant discrim-
ination observed against the female child. This finding is consistent with the previous
literature in India (Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011; Carranza, 2011). The extent of
discrimination ebbs due to the perceived economic value of investment in a girl in ethnic
groups where women ancestrally participate in productive activities. The hazard ratio is
much lower than one and statistically significant at the 1% levels, thus suggesting that
the sex-selective breastfeeding stop is lower due to higher economic value of women. My
findings are consistent with Carranza’s (2011) study which concludes significant positive
association between relative female labor force participation and breastfeeding of girls.
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Except for protein intake by female children — which is largely associated with women-
favoring social norms — the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant for
total vaccinations and child mortality. This can be attributed to a smaller sample size
for vaccination and low incidence of child mortality. These results are available in the
appendix (see Table 2.7, and Table 2.9). For protein intake, the coefficient of the social
norms index is quite meaningful. It suggests that a female child on an average is 8 percent
more likely to receive protein diets in societies where social norms favor women (see Table
2.8). This coefficient is also statistically significant at the 1% level. Once I unbundle these
women-favoring social norms, the favorable effect (12%) appears in societies featuring non-
patrilocal post-marital residence. In such circumstances, either the married couple dwell
with the bride’s kin or sets up a neutral household. In both the cases, women enjoy
greater bargaining power than the patrilocal setup.
As a robustness check, I re-estimate all the regressions of Table 2.4 to Table 2.9 by
including contemporaneous employment of mothers and the contemporaneous occupation
of mothers outside agriculture (Tables 2.10 to 2.15). This brings us closer to causal
interpretations by ruling out the mechanism that women’s current employment (Basu and
Basu, 1991) leads to gender bias estimates in parental desires, preferences, and behaviors.
I find that, even after controlling for contemporaneous occupation patterns of women, the
estimated coefficients remain unperturbed both in terms of size and statistical significance.
Therefore, the channel through contemporaneous women’s occupation can be ruled out.
More tellingly, this may be construed as a discouraging phenomenon. Women who were
ancestrally productive in their economic contribution are more likely to be employed, but
they are less likely to have a say on the money they earn, and thus female employment may
not lead to economic empowerment and rather be another means for economic exploitation
(Bhattacharya, 2015). With the proof of stickiness of norms, as well as, conditioning on
the environment, possibly the only mechanism left is the ancestral subsistence patterns
and ancestral women-favoring social norms which are still responsible for present-day
differences in gender bias that persists.
90
2.6 Conclusion
This paper presents some preliminary evidence. Within the geographic bounds of In-
dia’s Northeast that offers considerable diversity, the central observation is that women’s
productive role enhances their value in the society and promotes more gender-equal out-
comes and less sex-biased discrimination by parents. In ethnic groups where ancestral
female participation in productive economic activities are predominant, there is less evi-
dence of son-biased differential fertility behavior and breastfeeding discrimination against
girls. No statistically significant association is traceable to the immunization and child
mortality because of limited sample size and negligible incidence rates leading to lack of
power. The economically meaningful direction of effects — disconnected from the current
occupation of mothers — highlights the significance of ancestral gender roles as a deter-
minant of present-day gender equality. It underlines the importance of a threat point
in the analysis of women’s status and the implications for more gender-equal outcomes
for their children from a theoretical perspective. Social norms that strengthen women’s
intra-household and extra-household position define the relevant threat-point within mar-
riage, which yields favorable non-cooperative outcomes that are less gender unequal. This
contention opens up the possibility that women and their daughters may benefit from the
productive roles in agricultural and other allied productive activities. In summary, these
empirical regularities ascertain that the ancestral roots of persistent son-biased prefer-
ences of parents which complements that might deserve attention in the parental gender
bias literature.
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Appendices to Chapter 2
2.A Matching of ethnicity in NFHS with ethnicity in
People of India
Economists commonly use (Nunn and Qian, 2011; Enke, 2019; Alesina, Giuliano, and
Nunn, 2013; Michalopoulos, Putterman, and Weil, 2019; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou,
2013) the coded ethnographic atlas (Murdock, 1967). After exploring several other coded
ethnographic atlases (including Kirby et al., 2016; Gray, 1999; White et al., 1986; Ember
et al., 1992; Barry, 1980), I find none of those sufficiently cover the ethnic diversity in India.
Therefore, I identify the People of India as an alternative to extract information from the
qualitative ethnography. The People of India is a multi-volume compendium of books
presented for each sub-national state within India covering 4635 ethnic groups, which was
collected in a mammoth project ran by the Anthropological Survey of India under the
Indian Ministry of Culture during 1985-1992. Ethnographers spent on an average of 5.5
days with each community and recoded various aspects of traditional social norms through
first-hand interviews and with the help of the informants. This ethnographic atlas is not
yet popular among economists, despite offering greater coverage within India, probably
due to the qualitative nature of the information. I employ a double-blind coding protocol
to extract information and to identify the presence or absence of various subsistence
patterns among the ethnic groups in my study area. I identify 92 aboriginal ethnic
groups for whom I can extract definitive information about the presence or absence of five
modes of subsistence economy. The ancestral characteristics, customs and social norms at
the ethnic group level are then assigned from the coded ethnography from the People of
India on each child observation. Following a double-blind coding protocol, I coded eight
marriage customs (marriage payments, clan-, community-, and village-exogamy, close kin
marriageability, partner selection patterns, polygyny, and post-marital residence), four
separation norms (ease of divorce, alimony rights, custody, ease of remarriage), three
lineage norms (descent, inheritance, succession), six subsistence patterns (dependence on
agriculture, gathering, pastoralism, animal husbandry, hunting, fishing), the traditional
use of plough in cultivation, nine gender division of labor indicators (Ancestral female
participation in agricultural, gathering, fishing, hunting, animal husbandry, pastoralism,
92
weaving, basketry and politics), settlement patterns, and community land ownership.
Appendix Table 2.16 summarizes the incidence of each of these 30 social norms and
subsistence patterns. To combine NFHS observations with the ethnographic atlasPeople
of IndiaI need the reported ethnicity of the respondent. The recent NFHS conducted
in 2015 (NFHS-4) does not provide the data file for ethnicity. For NFHS conducted
in 2005 (NFHS-3), the reported ethnic group affiliation is available for men, women,
and household. The reported ethnicity is available for the household head in NFHS,
conducted in 1998 (NFHS-2). Although NFHS conducted in 1992 (NFHS-1) collected
ethnicity it differs considerably in terms of survey design, sample coverage and narrower
set of ethnicities (31 numerically coded from 1931 census list) for little over 10000 potential
observations. Thus, my analysis is limited to NFHS-2 and NFHS-3 pooled cross-sectional
data. It is important to highlight that the reported ethnic group names are text which is
not free from spelling errors. Most often those ethnic group names do not coincide readily
with the names of ethnic groups documented in the People of India. The first step in the
process is to identify a set of 92 ethnic groups who are aboriginal to the northeastern states
of India from People of India and code the qualitative and detailed ethnography for each
of them. Building on the matching procedure elaborated in the literature that combines
Murdock’s ethnographic data with the DHS data (for example, Alesina, Brioschi, and
La Ferrara, 2019; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2014), I develop a four-step matching
procedure by reconciling the differences in reported ethnicities in NFHS.
The most straightforward case is where the ethnic group name (text data) is identical
in spelling with the text name in People of India. This trivial process yields 37% women
and 76 ethnicities for NFHS-3. The direct match is viable for 31% of households and
65 ethnicities in NFHS-2. To maximize the pooled data, I collect the clan and sub-clan
names for the 92 target ethnic groups from People of India. After carefully studying the
chapters on each of the 92 ethnic groups in respective state volumes of People of India,
I could gather 1,269 clan and sub-clan names (Appendix Table 2.17). This massive ex-
ercise widens the direct match possibilities because the reported ethnicities likely might
have referred to the respondents’ clan or sub-clan micro-affiliation rather than the ethnic
groups. On average, each ethnicity has 14 clans or sub-clans, with a maximum of 180
clans and sub-clans for ‘Tagin’ ethnic group in aboriginal to Arunachal Pradesh. Sec-
ond, I conduct another direct match of stated ethnicity (text data) with the collection of
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1,269 clan and sub-clan names. For example, the ethnic name Karbi according to People
of India is found in NFHS in terms of their clan and sub-clan names (“Kulta”, “Ar-
leng”, “Mikir”, “Dumrali”, “Chintong”, “Ronghang”, “Amri”, “Ingty”, “Inghy”, “Teron”,
“Timung”, “Terang”, “Menkiri”) who are known to be kindred to the “Karbi” people.
This procedure cumulatively matches 42% of women from NFHS-3 and 34% household
from NFHS-2. The third method is manually correcting the spelling variation in the text
data in NFHS for 92 ethnic names. For instance, the ethnic name ‘Khasi’ is misspelt
in NFHS as “Kashi”, or “Khahi”, or “Khaso” or “Khati” to illustrate a few of the innu-
merable possibilities of spelling errors. This laborious spelling correction, however, yields
the maximum extent of matches. Cumulatively, after the third method, 76% of women
and 65% of households are matched. The fourth step is to manually synchronize spelling
variations for the 1,269 clan and sub-clan names. This most labor intensive step did not
yield much of incremental matches. After this step, I can match 80% of women from
NFHS-3 and 59% households from NFHS-2. Table 2.1 presents the number of women and
household heads were matched at each of the four matching methods. In the matched
data, there are 92 ethnic groups for NFHS-3 and 89 ethnic groups from NHFS-2. Three
ethnic groups, namely, “Yimchunger”, “Oraon”, and “Kom” are not found in the NFHS-2
sample. After cleaning the NFHS ethnic names, I merge those to the child level data.
Each child is assigned ethnicity based on their mother’s ethnicity in NFHS-3 and based
on their household head’s ethnicity in NFHS-2. The total pooled sample from two waves
of NFHS is 51,400 children.
2.B Combining environmental data with the matched
ethnographic-NFHS data
The variation in ancestral subsistence patterns is largely determined by the ancestral en-
vironmental conditions. These extra-environmental patterns are exogenous to the social
norms, customs, and ancestral subsistence patterns, unless ethnic groups self-select into
particular pockets, even within primary sampling units, with special environmental condi-
tions that might suit them most. To overcome the omitted variable bias, if environmental
factors determine social norms, I control for these environmental conditions. NFHS data
is not georeferenced. My strategy is to identify approximate geographic locations of the 92
94
ethnic groups in my sample. The minimum perimeter bounding box for the north-eastern
states of India is between Latitude (22.89 — 28.91) and Longitude (88.03 — 96.20). I infer
the geographic referencing of each ethnic group from the description of each ethnic group
in the respective chapter in People of India. I give a greater reliance on description about
their principal area of settlement unless the districts, sub-districts and specific villages are
mentioned. Appendix Table 2.18 presents the indicative evidence in the People of India
chapters which are used to put each ethnic group on the map and assign proxy latitude
and longitudes. I use these proxy geographic coordinates for adding soil suitability condi-
tions to the merged data. I add the data provided by Beck and Sieber (2010). They used
long-run (1961-1991) average patterns in climatic conditions (temperature, rainfall, alti-
tude) and soil characteristics to predict which the climate and soil conditions suits most
for the land-use types for four basic subsistence, such as, agriculture, hunting-gathering,
animal husbandry, and pastoralism. For each of these four land suitability measures, I
calculate mean and median at 20 kilometers, 50 kilometers, and 100 kilometers radii from
the geographic coordinates of each ethnic group, as separate variables.
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Table 2.16: Ancestral social norms and subsistence patterns by children and ethnic
groups
NFHS-3 Children NFHS-2 Children
Social norms Ethnicity Obs. Ethnicity Obs.
1. Marriage payments 90 27104 86 17614
Neither brideprice nor dowry 18 5980 16 5196
Only brideprice 62 17891 61 11127
Only dowry 6 1613 5 434
Both brideprice and dowry 4 1620 4 857
2. Kinship, marriage, organization 91 31075 87 19953
Clan endogamy 20 2891 20 2985
Clan exogamy 71 28184 67 16968
Community endogamy 82 26131 78 17277
Community exogamy 9 4944 9 2676
Village endogamy 84 22097 81 17091
Village exogamy 7 8978 6 2862
3. Kinship, marriage 91 31387 87 19972
No consanguinity 39 17958 36 9831
First cousin(FSD/MBD)/sororate/levirate 52 13429 51 10141
4. Marriage, domestic organization 92 31413 88 19987
Monogamy 86 29287 82 18902
Polygyny 6 2126 6 1085
5. Marriage types 92 31413 88 19987
Arranged marriage 44 8629 43 6389
Love marriage 5 6148 4 2044
Both arranged and love marriages 43 16636 41 11554
6. Post-marital residency norms 92 31413 88 19987
Patri/virilocal 72 22166 70 14523
Matri/uxorilocal/duolocal 6 4696 6 3420
Neolocal 14 4551 12 2044
7. Divorce rules 92 31413 88 19987
Unilateral divorce 6 1847 6 2178
Ease of 46 14133 44 8311
Society's/family's approval 23 5659 21 4266
Divorce is rare and discouraged 17 9774 17 5232
8. Alimony rights 92 31413 88 19987
No alimony after divorce 64 26133 61 15954
Alimony entitlement 28 5280 27 4033
9. Child custody rights 91 31141 87 19970
Father keeps 33 17164 31 7749
Mother keeps 10 5081 9 4100
Situational/either keeps 48 8896 47 8121
10. Remarriage norms 89 30425 85 19043
Not acceptable & rigid 3 4578 3 2276
Acceptable & fexible 86 25847 82 16767
11. Kinship: descent 92 31413 88 19987
Patrilineal 85 27115 81 16273
Matrilineal 7 4298 7 3714
91 31307 87 19750
Equigeniture 61 12943 58 9843
Male inheritance 23 13764 22 5925
Female inheritance 7 4600 7 3982
12. Wealth transactions:
inheritance(immovable,real)
(continued..)
105
92 31413 88 19987
Equigeniture 60 16289 58 11426
Male inheritance 25 10801 23 4580
Female inheritance 7 4323 7 3981
13. Plough 89 30522 85 19334
Plough is absent 63 23365 59 14539
Plough existed/aboriginal in society 26 7157 26 4795
Subsistence patterns
14. Subsistence economy : agriculture 92 31413 88 19987
No  7 1865 7 1713
Yes 85 29548 81 18274
15. Subsistence economy : gathering 92 31413 88 19987
No  5 2619 5 1708
Yes 87 28794 83 18279
16. Subsistence economy : hunting 92 31413 88 19987
No  58 16590 57 12703
Yes 34 14823 31 7284
17. Subsistence economy : fshing 92 31413 88 19987
No  48 11101 46 8739
Yes 44 20312 42 11248
18. Subsistence economy : animal husbandry 92 31413 88 19987
No  32 15538 31 8667
Yes 60 15875 57 11320
19. Subsistence economy : pastoralism 92 31413 88 19987
No  64 18969 61 11876
Yes 28 12444 27 8111
20. Subsistence economy, gender: agriculture 92 31413 88 19987
No female participation in agriculture 13 6335 13 5080
Yes 79 25078 75 14907
21. Subsistence economy, gender: gathering 92 31413 88 19987
No female participation in gathering 15 8576 14 4925
Yes 77 22837 74 15062
22. Subsistence economy, gender: hunting 92 31413 88 19987
No female participation in hunting 91 31392 87 19965
Yes 1 21 1 22
23. Subsistence economy, gender: fshing 92 31413 88 19987
No female participation in fshing 78 28009 74 16884
Yes 14 3404 14 3103
24. Subsistence economy, gender: husbandry 92 31413 88 19987
No female participation in husbandry 52 16871 49 12080
Yes 40 14542 39 7907
25. Subsistence economy, gender: pastoralism 92 31413 88 19987
No female participation in pastoralism 90 30923 86 19281
Yes 2 490 2 706
26. Subsistence economy, gender: weaving 92 31413 88 19987
No female participation in weaving 45 15089 44 11051
Yes 47 16324 44 8936
27. Subsistence economy, gender: basketry 92 31413 88 19987
No female participation in basketry 70 25369 67 15558
Yes 22 6044 21 4429
12. Wealth transactions:
inheritance(movable)
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28. Politics,leadership,gender 92 31413 88 19987
No female participation in politics 88 28758 84 17587
Yes 4 2655 4 2400
29.  Land ownership patterns 92 31413 88 19987
Private ownership of land 10 3471 10 1877
Society/community ownership of land 74 26019 70 16620
Landless 8 1923 8 1490
30. Settlements patterns 92 31413 88 19987
Compact/relatively permanent 42 18002 39 12119
48 13028 47 7292
Semi-nomadic 1/2  year; or semi-sedentary 2 383 2 576
Separated hamlets/semi-permanent/dispersed
neighborhoods 
Source: People of India as coded by author.
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Table 2.17: List of clan or sub-clan names by 92 ethnic groups
Ethnic groups Clans/sub-clan names
Sikkim
Bhutia 27
5
Chetri 18
Gurung 28
Lepcha 10
32
Mangar 19
Rai 18
Sherpa 14
10
Tamang 37
Number
clans
Bhot Bhotia Drukpa Drukul Chumbipas Dhoptapas Trompas
Domupas Lachenpa Lachungpa Lhori Tondu Russhi Chechu
Thapa Shandarpa Kachopa Shengapa Beb Tsen Gye Gansapa
Namchangopa Chungiopa Ithenpa Phenchungpa Phenpunadik
Namnakpa Nachangpa
Bhujel Khawa Khusila Kashyap Kashi
Kshatriya Khas Bista Subadi Basnet Adhikari Nirula Bhandari
Paural Thorje Katwal Bhattarai Thapa Andari Karki Kami
Damai Sarki
Gurkhali Ghale Ghonde Lama Lamichane Ghyabre Kyabchne
Kurumchhe Jangre Aring Dorjali Rilami Poju Chormi Pom
Thin Migi Khatra Yog Paingi Kholali Sogun Thorjami Tu
Puru Ko Kidu Chiva
Rongkup Mutanchi Rong Monpa Kirate Maris Mayal Rongring
Ring Kirati
Limboo Limbu Li Abu Bow Yakthumba Lum Tsong Subba Kiranti
Sibakota Tsang Limbuana Sirijunga Jhung Nambang Thagim
Libang Tamling Pandhak Sering Laotti Muringlanugo Muringla
Nugo Phurumbo Phendua Nambang Thagim Libang Damai
Kami Sarki
Pulami Ala Kepchake Guranga Darlami Pun Lungalim
Lamichani Khapangi Loharung Purbachane Rana Mangratey
Lumrey Gholey Maske Balangpak Molalay Sitong
Jimdar Khambu Manjh Walla Kura Bantawa Chamling
Thulung Kulung Paldorje Bangdel Dungmali Nechali Khaling
Chhinamkhong Rajolim Dumi Dukhun
Sharya Solukhambu Yukpa Shalakha Rinasha Lama Chayaba
Goperma Khambase
Sunuwar Sunwar Mukhiya Barathare Dasthare Jirel Sunupar Sunkoshi
Koicha Poinba Grangden
Tagmaluijin Nishung Moklan Yonjan Lopchan Thing Bomyan
Bal Pakkrin Darneih Syangbo Waiba Thokar Jhimba Dong
Titung Gyapok Domjan Bropchan Negi Golay Kalden Chising
Singon Remba Nyasum Chungma Syangden Yonjan Bomjan
Domjan Lopchan Sangdan Moktan Dong Bal Titung
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Arunachal Pradesh
46
20
5
9
3
Chakma 39
7
Hill Miri 1
11
Miri 8
39
6
14
3
1
Adi Bokar Taluk Tapo Tapir Tapin Yajo Bune Borak Mardo Singlong
Tame Taping Ungring Sammame Samine Chije Puing Puder
Yuring Yourpin Hemi Pudur Pyasang Pujen Pulom Yourchi
Tempin Pudu Popak Lupo Yourgo Yourko Youring Gindo-
Dupa Mardo Umlong Komlon Maine Lupo Yourgo Yourko
Youring Gindo-Dupa Mardo Umlong Komlom Maine
Adi Gallong Topo Galo Tator Tani Karga Bogum Lodu Kar Taipodia
Paktu Karka Ete Loi Loya Lolen Bagra Ang Ado Doke Doje
Adi Minyoung Teli Taki Jamo Siran Moyong
Adi Pasi Dai Rukbo Mengu Yomso Apum Teknyo Yompang Yomain
Mekir
Apatani Tani Mith Mora
Tsakma Tsak Thek Tsakma Sakma Changma Changmyang
Tsakthek Chamma Jumia Jummua Dainonak Changchhan
Tuichek Chek Takamb Chawngte Dameyi Huttia Barseke
Hammey Dachya Bangsa Malima Rangi Baurua Boga Thanya
Kukua Angnu Fema Fedengsuri Fagola Hamuja Lachra
Homreng Naduktu Karma Fajera
Deori Boderiyo Patriyochau Dupiyao Khottia Hizaru Lapharu
Gucharu
Mantai
Khampti Namsoom Nangmao Manwai Mannoi Manpang Manpoong
Manchi Manchai Manoi Chowhati Manjakhoon
Oyan Saeng Maying Pator Dambuk Mirang Tamar Nuthunjee
Monpa But Matchopa Bootpa Butpa Shingjee Rahungjee Khoitumjee
Khonujee Sunukjee Rinchiadu Yammujee Khoitamjee
Runfunjee Ropu Chandok Dunglok Chug Chugpa Gumupa
Khumupa Khumuthongkor Ngarmupa Changmuchipa Dirang
Tsangla Faichurpa Gunpapa Baqipam Shorthefa Kalaktang
Lish Lishpa Kishpi Thankhar Khumu Jamkhar Khumu
Khumusangla Borzu Nyarmu Tawang Brahmi Monpa
Mishmi Idu Pulu Mendo Mega Lingi Michichi Harku
Nishi Nishang Dol Dodum Dopum Durum-Dui Dukum-Duri Tasu
Likha Chuhu Takyang Yowa Tade Tajing Byabang
Nocte Lowang Channa Mikhiak
Singpho Jingpho
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181
Nagaland
Angami 23
Ao 10
Chang 12
2
Tangsa Ketna Havi Hawai Mandok Takhe Bontai Nokka Pangtha
Solting Songthing Kelum Wangpap Ngaimong Ketchi Mantai
Jugli Yougli Taiman Taikhaw Taikin Kolral Kolhriyen Korang
Korah Jank Jok Taibi Menti Khonga Khangnyal Kimsing
Chamchang Sina Sehang Langtin Latom Maipole Mepok
Chhojam Sejam Chaso Changso Cholam Cholum Lungchang
Kenglang Khomrang Namai Lulin Tailong Lungphi Yongkhung
Tairing Khoipang Morang Mungray
Nyamran Tapsang Haile Hailang Palket Kethong Sano Mosang
Rangkhaw Lomko Chithang Wakpat Kethung Rangwang
Jongkhung Ranka Thampong Teekhaon Muklom Mokolm
Monglum Tangha Cohangmi Khimhun Techi Shungkho
Rekhung Wangra Tekhil Yangchang Matcha Sayung Ngemu
Nalang Kitnal Ronrang Poerah Longti Woety  Chumbyu
Lishey Chummut Gahja Nokwi Jangloo Shesu Matwa Pechong
Kewa Kubu Shama Rigang Nori Ngalo Langhe
Joeboi Rewey Diwa Tamkote Morang Kuchit Lomme Nagu
Kisha Shosa Wellyo Sangwal Charwan Sangkhu Taipon Taiwai
Sangrang Taiboi Telung Sanke Sechu Chasha Keykap
Kongrang Kianoo Taorah Nangkong Khokhong Lowey Allon
Chuwrah Wanpi Sintak Shongrey Tikhak Tailong Hanglung
Taching Tairing Longjing Mokhom Wankhang Momai
Jangshong Taimak Taidang Taihu Kamba Taichu Taitha
Mungkhom Mowan Tonglim Tyolim Tonglum
Chokhang Chunga Dewe Jankhe Khangla Khanyak Khapwing
Koje Kunsing Wyonsongm Yongkuk Ngokhom Tailong Taihu
Taichu Kamba Taitha
Tengima Gnamei Tsungumi Tsungung Mour Chakroma
Tengima Chakrama Kezami Putir Dzunokehena Zounuo
Keyhonuo Khonoma Tengima Kezami Khezha Memi Pezina
Pepfuma Tepa Thevo Kemovo
Aor Chunglir Chongli Mongsen Changki Dikhu Melak Tsurong
Pongen Lomou
Chongnu Changsang Mazung Duenching Changru Changhlai
Kangshau Ong Hongang Ongbou Lakpu Youkoubu
Khiamngan Kelukenyu Yingshanku
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35
Lotha 3
Phom 2
26
Rengma 3
Sangtam 2
Sema 8
13
Zeliang 24
12
34
Manipur
Hmar 8
7
7
Loi 8
Mao 7
8
Konyak/Wancho Haha Taprongumi Minyumo Nagami Mirirr Chagk Nahngra
Lwang Kongnok Angnophang Wanghu Paiknok Matpisun
Yanlam Laktu Hu Hentokhu Punlonghu Angwanhu Shishohu
Manching Wangnanting Wonghu Wangnayaum
Wangchingphong Lwang Angnophang Ang Konyak Tangjan
Tsangjan Wangham Wangpan Wangsa Wangsu Bailung
Kyon Chuwami Eryung
Kahha Nyuthery
Pochury Sapo Kechuri Khury Sozomi Kheza Nyushury Shantary Shomli
Tsori Nyusoury Nyuwiry Ngory Phochiry Pojar Katiry Trakha
Jurry Fithu Thurr Thupitou Leyri Tsang Nyuwiri Nyutheri
Nqouri Nyuwini
Ntenye Nzong Raimye
Tukomi Sangtamrr
Semi Sumi Yathi Igha Kukami Awo-U Asashokipini Khiphur
Yimchunger Yanchunger Yachumi Yimchuger Tikhir Makware Chirr
Jankhurnger Janger Khiumger N'daine Kusun Khiunger
Limkhiungkhugar
Zemei Zemi Liangmei Zeliangrong Rongmei Mpame Newme
Nriame Sogome Kenye Hararme Gangmei Pamei Malangmei
Riamei Dhangmei N'rongmei Newmei Tinkupen Kedeipeo
Kamei Gonmei Gangmei Mu
Chakhesang Chakhru Kheza Chazho Thevo Khamutso Epao Putso Kheza
Khutso Lawa Mero Khezha
Kuki Chin Khongshai Khonjai Khosamai Kotsoma Kuki-Chin Lushai
Lakher Lua Kumki Choughthu Lnykim Lengthang Singsit
Thado Vaiphei Gangte Changsan Kholhou Thangugen
Lhangsum Aengna Hauneng Daugel Bangsing Chougloi Haolai
Sitlhou Thado Haokip Kipgen Singsin Haosa Thempu
Sinlung Inpui Inpuisuok Tutluk Tutluksouk Chimsen
Chimsensuok Sal
Kabui Rongmei Haumei Kammei Ganmei Langmei Gangmei
Khandangmei
Kom Karong Saicho Leivon Tolon Serto Lupheng Mangte
Chakpa Ningthouja Angom Khumal Moirang Luwang Sarang-
Leishangthem Khaba-Nganba
Imemi Memei Lepaona Saranami Paomata Kapematta
Tolepamatta
Maring Chimkur Dangsa Charanga Kansouwa Mekunga Khulpuwa
Lamthakka Hleyowa
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Meitei 8
13
8
10
Vaiphei 14
Mizoram
Mizo/Biate 20
Thadou 14
Tripura
5
13
Mog 14
4
Munda 9
2
12
7
1
7
Tripuri 18
3
Meghalaya
Khasi 13
Jaintia 10
Manipuri Ningthouja Angom Chengloi Ngongba Looang
Khoomon Moirang
Paite/Zou Paihte Tedim Chin Gwite Sukte Nwite Kamhau Nwingalte
Akambau Manlun Samte Simte Zoukam Manlun
Pangal Shiekh Sayyed Pathan Shah Khan Choudhury Mia Khaaoraora
Tangkhul Noga Naokhokha Raphei Kashung Reekhang Rem Kamo
Kharao Khaorui Chontung
Suantak Vanglua Neilut Thanglet Puakpawl Hansing Saivung
Chonlu Khaute Phaltual Chonmang Ellu Keusel Neisial
Baite Biete Duhlian Ngamlai Nampui Chungngawl Zate Tamte
Thlihran Royang Thianglai Hmunhring Khurbi Puilo Faihriam
Darnei Kampui Ngamlai Ngirsim Thiate
Chongthu Duhlian Sitthloh Khuangsai Milui Singsuan
Lianthang Haukip Kipgen Thongpam Dongel Chawngthu Lal
Upa
Haluadas Sonahatia Chhabhaiya Astisuddha Kashyap Rachi
Jugi Jogi Nath Tanti Shiv Ekadashi Masya Halwa Ranrej Kambule
Manihari Palangsa Barendra Baidik Nath
Magh Mag Maga Mugg Mogh Marma Kokpyasa Khangsa
Cheringsa Marusa Wodgensa Wookkinsa Chakpregia Rakhocha
Mahisyadas Matsyadas Haluadas Halladas Alambayana
Mura Kerketta Kanduru Gondli Hansa Jirhul Bhengra
Mundori Porti
Namasudra Kashyap Gaigra
Noatia Naitang Gabing Khaklu Anak Fatuij Mougbai Taugbai Keora
Khalni Harbeng Daindak Kerang
Nunia Chouchan Semara Kharhadia Haudihoya Nunchuhua
Matkatowa Belderowa
Patni Alimman
Riang Meska Raicha Charkhi Mochha Chompreng Waireng Apaia
Tripra Tipera Deb Barman Bachal Siuk Kuatia Daitya-Singh
Hujuria Siltia Chatratuia Chatradharia Deunai Subenarayan
Sena Julai Beri Dona Daspa
Kapali Kashyap Harihar Alimman
Amwi Lyngam Bhoi War Khynriam Khynrium Syiem Lyngdoh
Walang Rayand Songkali Lapang Dorphang
Pnar Synteng Syntang Amwi Changpung Jowai Nartia Raliana
Sutnga Matabeng
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Garo 20
12
Hajong 16
Assam
12
15
8
7
Kachari 3
Bodo 3
5
12
Karbi
11
-
7
5
1
5
Meitei
10
Munda 1
-
1
8
12
Santhal
11
14
Mande Achik Akawe Awe Chisak Dual Machi Ambeng Abeng
Chibok Ruga Ganching Gara Atong Megam Sangma Marak
Momin Areng Shira
Rabha Rongdani Naitori Pati Dahuri Pati Dahori Rongdani Maitori
Total Kocha Rato
Khatal Parachungwa Chondi Parakati Baliati Kendegaon
Dingar Akshigaon Tokleygaon Sinulgaon Difragaon Kashigaon
Phulgaon Ghorabali Koitar Sonamukhi
Ahom Raja Burgohain Borgohain Duwara Dihingiya Lahon Sandikai
Deodhai Mohan Panch Chiring Tai
Bishnupriya Leimanai Ningthuanai Khoomala Moirang Angam Luwang
Mangang Ningthoja Khabananba Mudgalya Angiras Atreya
Bharadwaja Kausika Sandilya Gautam
Chutiya Birinchi Borahi Deori Levite Bora Hazarika Chetia Barua
Hira Byash Sanatan Sutor Raghunath Bhewali Medhi Sarandas
Barman Khunang Dilek
Swarga-Aroi Basumatary Musa-Aroi
Kaibarta Nadial Jalia Bamunia Haridhwania Sutradhar
Kalita Kulta Kulata Kulalipta Kakati Das Bharali Patahk Medhi
Bhuyan Timung Saikia Deka
Arleng Mikir Dumrali Chintong Ronghang Amri Ingty Inghy
Teron Terang Menkiri
Keot
Kharia Dudh Dhelki Pahari Suren Barla Dhanwar Kerketa
Kurmi Bedia Kurmi Surya Nath Bahohier Tirower
Lalung Tiwa
Matak Moran Moamaria Senapati Mayamara Khoomon
Manipuri Meithei Moirang Koomul Ningthouja Angom
Chengloi Ngongba Looang Moirang
Haroko
Namasudra
Oraon Kurukh
Rajbanshi Koch Pathak Dihidar Phousdar Singha Pradhani Adhikari
Maghahia
Ravidas Chamar Muchi Piplang Kachchhap Kush Nona Kanaujia
Dushia Jeshwara Bedis Tota Bhojpuria
Kisku Tudu Hembrom Hasdak Besra Baskey Soren Marndi
Core Phatowal Pauris
Sonowal Kachari Bali Khitiari Chiripuria Amarabamiya Dhulial Ujani Kuchia
Namoni Kuchia Tipamia Betari Gezepi Memi Makrari
Neskatari Hagumiri Nakrari
Notes: Total number of clans and sub-clans for 92 aboriginal ethnic groups is 1,269 as mentioned in the
People of India chapters.
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Table 2.18: Georeferencing of ethnic groups
Ethnic groups Latitude Longitude
Sikkim
27.2925 88.2457
Tamang 27.2349 88.5788
Bhutia 27.7167 88.5539
27.2312 88.4671
Chetri 27.3720 88.2122
Gurung 27.2678 88.0776
Lepcha 27.5098 88.4288
27.1349 88.1506
Mangar 27.1791 88.3305
Rai 27.3073 88.1323
Sherpa 27.1426 88.0682
Arunachal Pradesh
28.1213 95.8374
27.5466 93.8006
Chakma 27.4866 96.2018
27.6635 95.8412
Hill Miri 27.6783 93.5131
26.9902 95.4646
Miri 28.0365 95.3141
27.5861 91.8507
Excerpts from People of India indicative of geo-
location of ethnic groups
Sunuwar West district; Hilly terrain; High Altitude;
High Humidity; Forest; Heavy Rainfall
Lower Teesta valley, Rangit valley
North Sikkim;Hilly terrain; High Altitude;
Lachung-Pa; Lachen-Pa
Bhujel South sikkim, Hilly Terrain, Mean altitude
1500meters; Tokal village
West, South, East districts; Hill slopes; 900
meters-1900 meters; Teesta and Rangit rivers
South, West districts; Hilly terrain; High
Altitude; Forest; Heavy Rainfall
North district; Extreme cold climate; lower
altitude in contrast to Bhutias, Not snow-
bound places; Dzongu area
Limboo Western district;Sparsely forested slopes, 1200
meters to 1900 meters
South district;1200 meters to 1900 meters;
Teesta and Rangit River; Good monsoon
rainfall.
East,West, South district; 900 meters-1900
meters; Few in the North district.
West district, Okhray, Tikpur, Rumbuk, Ridpi,
Bhareng, Sapray-nagi, Burikhop, Soreng,
Singling, Dentam
Adi Pasi Balek, Rasam, Kalek, Pasighat
Apatani Apatani valley, Ziro, Hapoli. Lower Subansiri
district
Baijan circle in Lower subansiri district, miao
sub-division of changlang district, chowkam
circle of lohit district
Deori Lekang circle in mahadevpur area, dayun circle
in lohit district
Ziro and Daporizo Sub-Division of Lower and
Upper Subansiri District, majority in lower
subansiri
Khampti Tirap District, South of Lohit river
East Siang, majority lives in Assam
Monpa West Kameng District, Tawang District
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28.9158 95.6054
27.8026 94.2860
26.9025 95.5086
27.1357 95.7258
27.5368 93.8812
27.1357 95.7258
28.1664 94.6973
28.1637 94.7695
28.0619 95.3172
Nagaland
Konyak 26.7219 95.0198
Lotha 26.0911 94.2372
Phom 26.4907 94.8049
25.6810 94.6146
Rengma 25.7161 94.0068
Sangtam 25.8694 94.7833
Sema 26.0132 94.5065
26.2366 94.7862
Zeliang 25.7612 93.8276 South-western part of Kohima district
25.6297 94.4020
25.7612 93.8276
Angami 25.6747 94.0718 Kohima district,
Ao 26.4352 94.4824
Chang 26.3137 94.8490
26.2026 95.0061
Manipur
Loi 24.7270 94.0059 Imphal district
Mao 25.4618 94.1966 Senapati district
24.4433 94.1177
Meitei 24.4970 93.7556 Manipur valley
24.0928 93.2954
24.6495 93.9702
24.8600 94.4971
Mishmi Idu DibangValley District
Nishi Upper and Lower Subansiri District, near the
streams Khru Ranga Dikrang
Nocte Khonsa, Namsang, Laju circles of Tirap
District, Borduria and Mansang VIllage
Singpho Changlang and Lohit district, area drained by
rivers Burhi-Dihing, Noa-Dihing, Tengapani
Tagin Upper Subansiri district
Tangsa Changlang district, Manmao and Nampong
circles
Adi Bokar West Siang district, Gesing, Pangri
Adi Gallong West Siang district, Along, Basar, rugged
mountains
Adi Minyoung Pasighat, Kabang, Yemsing
Mon district
Wokha district
Tuensang district, Longleng subdivision
Pochury Phek district, Meluri sub-division
Kohima district, Tseminyu sub-division
Tuensang district, Kiphire subdivision
Zunheboto district
Yimchunger Tuensang district
Chakhesang Phek district, cold and hilly
Kuki Ghaspani and Dimapur blocks, village Maoua
Haathigurya, Tokthoriya, Eserenia, Mokochung
district
central hilly part of Tuensang district
Khiamngan eastern part of Tuensang district
Maring Khudei Khullen village, northern part of
Tengnoupal district
Paite Zougam area; unft for wet cultivation
Pangal Imphal, Thoubal, Bishnupur
Tangkhul East district; Meikhel village; 12 kms south
east of Kohima.
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Vaiphei 24.1454 93.5833
Hmar 24.1384 93.9488 southern district Manipur
25.1626 93.4611
24.9469 93.9779
Mizoram
Thadou 24.1135 92.9121
Mizo/Biate 24.0137 92.9156
Tripura
23.9046 91.3410
23.8142 91.4065 West Tripura
Mog 23.2826 91.5411
23.6059 91.8153
23.5341 91.4666 South Tripura District, Udaipur Sub-Division
23.5224 91.6403
23.8342 91.3576
23.8203 91.2124
23.5341 91.4666 West Tripura
Tripuri 23.9607 91.3991 West Tripura
23.8292 91.6030
Meghalaya
25.7910 90.8401
Hajong 25.3879 89.8989
Khasi 25.4223 91.4756
Jaintia 25.4494 92.0565
Garo 25.5720 90.5675
Assam
24.6798 92.5281
26.9878 94.5729
26.1611 90.5949
Kachari 25.1373 92.7567
Bodo 26.4132 91.8098
Churachandpur district
Kabui barrail ranges western part of manipur
Kom Village Sinam Kom
North-eastern part of Mizoram, Darlawn Block,
Ratu
north-eastern part of Mizoram, Aizawl district,
Darlawn community development block,
Darlawn.
Haluadas West Tripura; Plains, warm and temperate
climate; High humidity, heavy rainfall.
Jugi
South Tripura,Bilonia Sub-Division
Mahisyadas Hilly and Forest Terrain, heavy rainfall, All
over Tripura
Namasudra
Noatia South Tripura District, Amarpur Sub-Division
Nunia West Tripura, Plains; Forest;Warm climate;
High humidity; Heavy rainfall
Patni West Tripura, Plains; Forest;Warm climate;
High humidity; Heavy rainfall
Riang
Kapali all districts, warm and temoerate climate, high
humidity, heavy rainfall
Rabha northern area of east garo hills
plains of south-west of west garohillls
khasi hills
jaintia hills district
garo hills
Bishnupriya Cachar District
Chutiya Goalpara, Kamrup, Darrang, Nowgong,
Sibsagar
Hira Goalpara (Kusia Kata, Hojalpara, Bistupur),
Barpeta (Budarutup, Sundaridlia)
Cachar District
Kokrajhar, Darrang, Goalpara, Kamrup
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27.4703 94.8826 Plains, Dibrugarh
25.4300 90.1100 Between 25.43 and 26.53, 90.11
26.7429 94.1324
Karbi 25.8384 93.4078 Karbi Anglong District
26.1430 91.5628 no specifc description given
27.8463 95.2873 tea garden
26.2769 94.0630 tea garden
26.2351 92.8981
27.1823 94.7271 Brahmaputra Valley, Upper Assam
26.5431 91.9115
Munda 27.5678 95.5478
25.5678 94.5478 tea garden
26.0257 89.9584
24.5678 94.5478 tea garden
Santhal 26.3827 90.0220
Sonowal Kachari
Kalita
Kaibarta Kamrup, Darrang, Nowgong, Jorhat districts
Keot
Kharia
Kurmi
Lalung "most of them are found in jowai subdivision of
Jayantia distrct, Meghalaya", Nagaon district
most, also Lakhimpur, Sibsagar
Ahom
Matak Dibrugarh, Sibsagar, Lakhimpur, Darrang
tea garden, Doomdooma area
Oraon
Rajbanshi Goalpara, Kokrajhar, Kamrup
Ravidas
tea garden, mostly Kokrajhar, Kachugaon area
Notes: Each ethnic groups are assigned to a geographic location depending on the major concentration
as indicated in the People of India chapters. Wherever district are indicated as major concentration,
we have considered supplementary information, such as, rivers, valleys, plains, or altitude of preferred
settlement of the concerned ethnic groups to determine approximate latitude and longitude for each ethnic
groups. In cases where no information is available, we explored census data to find out districts with
major concentration after verifying from the district government websites. In the cases specific villages
are mentioned as their ancestral homes, those are the georeferenced.
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Table 2.20: Ancestral predictors of contemporary occupation of women
Dependent variable: Contemporary
Estimation method: OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
A.
Ancestral female participation: agriculture 0.01 0.02** 0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.00 -0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Non-patrilocal residence 0.09*** 0.04*** 0.04*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Ease of divorce 0.04*** 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Matrilineal descent -0.02 -0.02 -0.06***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
0.15 0.19 0.06
B.
Ancestral female participation: agriculture 0.00 0.02** 0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ancestral female participation:agriculture and production-0.01 -0.02 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Social norms index 0.04*** 0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.14 0.19 0.06
C.
Ancestral female participation: agriculture 0.01 0.02** 0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ancestral female participation:agriculture and production-0.02 -0.02 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.14 0.19 0.06
Number of ethnic groups (clusters) 92 92 92
Observations 22,120 22,161 22,112
Women's
working
status
Women's
work in
agri.
Women's work
outside agri.
Ancestral female participation:agriculture and
production
R2
R2
R2
Notes: In the three panels above, we regress mother’s contemporary occupation (A) on all three women-
favoring social norms, (B) on an additive index of three social norms, and (C) without social norms. The
3 dependent variables are contemporary women’s working status, contemporary women working in agricul-
ture, and contemporary women working outside agriculture for women aged 15-49. Coefficients for each
explanatory variable of interest are reported in the rows. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and
are clustered at ethnic group level. Sampling weights are applied. ***, ** , and * indicate significance at
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.For descriptions and definitions of variables see Table 2.4.
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Ideal number of children
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Fathers' son-preference
0
.0
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Figure 2.2: Son preference and daughter preference of women and men
Notes: A residualized measure following (Jayachandran, 2017b) is plotted on the vertical
axis over the desired fertility on the horizontal axis. In the left-panel, I derive the resid-
ualized stated son-preference by regressing “wants more boys than girls” variable on the
desired number of children, for both women and men. In the right panel, the residualized
stated daughter-preference is plotted and derived by regressing “wants more girls than boys”
variable on the desired number of children.
People of India
Murdock
North-east India
Georeferencing of tribal locations
(a) North East India
People of India
Murdock
North-east India
Georeferencing of tribal locations
(b) Nagaland
Figure 2.3: Comparative geolocations of ethnic groups: Murdock and People of India
Source: Authors’ comparative analysis of People of India and Murdock’s ethnographic atlas.
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Ancestral tribe locations
Suitability Index
0.0
0.23
0.46
0.70
0.93
Land suitability for agriculture
(a) Agriculture
Ancestral tribal locations
Land suitability index
0.00
0.23
0.46
0.70
0.93
Land suitability for pastoralism
(b) Pastoralism
Figure 2.4: Land Suitability: Agriculture and Pastoralism
Source: Predicted land suitability data from Beck and Sieber’s (2010) Ecological Niche Model
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Ancestral tribal locations
Land suitability index
0.00
0.24
0.49
0.73
0.97
Land suitability for hunting and gathering
(a) Hunting and Gathering
Ancestral tribal locations
Land suitability index
0
0.24
0.48
0.73
0.97
Land suitability for animal husbandry
(b) Animal Husbandry
Figure 2.5: Land Suitability: Hunting and Gathering and Animal Husbandry
Source: Predicted land suitability data from Beck and Sieber’s (2010) Ecological Niche Model
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(a) Arunachal Pradesh (b) Assam
(c) Manipur (d) Meghalaya
(e) Mizoram
(f) Nagaland
(g) Sikkim (h) Tripura
Figure 2.6: Geolocations of ethnic groups
Source: Authors’ analysis of People of India ethnographic atlas.
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